William & Mary Business Law Review
Volume 5 (2014)
Issue 2

Article 3

April 2014

Worse than the Tower of Babel? Remedying Antitrust’s False
Dichotomy Through De Novo Appellate Review
Steven Semeraro

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons

Repository Citation
Steven Semeraro, Worse than the Tower of Babel? Remedying Antitrust’s False Dichotomy
Through De Novo Appellate Review, 5 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 413 (2014),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/vol5/iss2/3
Copyright c 2014 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr

WORSE THAN THE TOWER OF BABEL? REMEDYING
ANTITRUST’S FALSE DICHOTOMY THROUGH
DE NOVO APPELLATE REVIEW
STEVEN SEMERARO
ABSTRACT

Modern antitrust analysis rests on a strange perch. Its paradigmatic
method—pretentiously entitled the Rule of Reason—appears (but only appears) to be a dichotomous analytic. At the first stage, a court supposedly
defines the relevant market and determines, as a matter of fact, whether
marketplace forces constrain the defendant from profitably raising price
above the level that would prevail in a competitive market. Only when market forces are inadequate to protect consumers, that is, the defendant has
market power, does the court proceed to stage two, at which it assesses, as
a matter of law, whether the defendant used its power improperly.
Nothing approaching this dichotomous analytic paradigm is true. The
ostensibly separate inquiries into market power and competitive effects
are really a unitary assessment of the industry’s best competitive makeup,
that is the allocation of business realms into those requiring rivalry and
those in which cooperation or foreclosure are permitted. For example,
rivalry is usually required in the realm of short-run price competition. But
in some cases, such as when a firm holds a valuable patent, courts permit
foreclosure in that short-term realm in order to foster competition to innovate new products over the longer term.
Although the “competitive makeup” term of art is foreign to the antitrust
vocabulary, it captures actual antitrust practice in the courts. Everybody
knows that pure competition is a fiction; all industries involve an amalgam of

Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. In the 1990s, the author was a
trial attorney with the United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division. The views
expressed in this Article are entirely those of the author. The author thanks Deven Desai
and Chris Guzelian for their helpful discussions relating to the thesis of this Article and
especially Chris for suggesting the connection between Austrian economics and the
competitive makeup approach to antitrust law.
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competitive, cooperative, and foreclosed realms. And antitrust law requires
competition only where it serves consumer interests.
Although many experts question whether federal judges can effectively
assess business conduct as the competitive makeup approach requires,
Austrian economics provides a theoretical justification for concluding that
thoughtful judges can do a better job of resolving antitrust cases than
would mindless, automaton courts applying necessarily over- and underinclusive bright-line prophylactic rules. Most importantly, the Supreme
Court has to date, including its most recent 2013 decision, demanded that
federal judges engage theory and make thoughtful antitrust decisions.
Although much of this Article is interpretive, attempting to explain
what courts actually do when they say they are applying the antitrust dichotomy, it recognizes a significant problem that requires a remedy. Trial
judges have the power to dictate the level of scrutiny that appellate courts
will apply to their decisions. The false dichotomy can be manipulated so
that most decisions can be framed as either issues of market definition,
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, or competitive effect,
reviewed de novo. Given the complexity and social import of many antitrust cases, a single federal judge should not have this power.
Appellate courts should thus abandon the clearly erroneous standard
of review for market definition. The Supreme Court requires independent
appellate scrutiny of fact-findings controlling important issues of public
policy that are indistinguishable from the antitrust laws. It would thus be a
small, but important, step to impose a de novo review standard for all
antitrust issues.
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INTRODUCTION
There’s something happening and you don’t know what it is, do you,
Mr. Jones?
—BOB DYLAN, Ballad of a Thin Man1
Everybody knows that the dice are loaded, everybody rolls with their
fingers crossed ... that’s how it goes, and everybody knows.
—LEONARD COHEN, Everybody Knows2
Modern antitrust analysis rests on a strange perch. Its paradigmatic
method—pretentiously entitled the “Rule of Reason”3—appears (but only
appears) to be a dichotomous analytic. At the first stage of the analysis, a
court supposedly defines the relevant market and determines, as a matter of
fact, whether market forces constrain the defendant from profitably raising
price above the level that would prevail in a competitive market. Only when
market forces are inadequate to protect consumers—that is, the defendant
has market power4—does the court proceed to stage two where it assesses,
as a matter of law, whether the defendant used its power improperly.5
In a 2011 article, Harvard Law School Professor Louis Kaplow described this paradigm as “worse than ... the Tower of Babel.”6 Workers constructing the tower, he wrote, were “[a]t least ... aware that their utterances
were mutually incomprehensible.”7 When it comes to antitrust, “everyone

1

BOB DYLAN, Ballad of a Thin Man, on HIGHWAY 61 REVISITED (Columbia Records 1965).
LEONARD COHEN, Everybody Knows, on I’M YOUR MAN (Columbia Records 1988).
3
In a small group of cases involving naked horizontal agreements not to compete, antitrust liability is imposed without reference to market power. See infra Part IV.F.4.a.
4
See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984)
(noting that “[m]arket power is the ability to raise prices above those that would be
charged in a competitive market”).
5
Although, in generic discussion, competitive effects are often expressed in terms of
objective price increases, in actual cases these effects take a variety of different forms.
For example, neither of the two significant antitrust trials of the late 1990s focused on
price increases. Instead, both focused on the effects of practices designed to undermine
potential or existing competitors. See generally Microsoft v. United States, 253 F.3d 34,
50 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 340–42
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
6
Louis Kaplow, Market Share Thresholds: On the Conflation of Empirical Assessments and Legal Policy Judgments, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 243, 264 (2011).
7
Id.
2
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seems to write and speak as if others have a common understanding.”8 But,
according to Kaplow, they do not: the judges’ and lawyers’ unarticulated
intuitions and assumptions are as vital to their decisions as they are inaccessible to each other.9 Kaplow effectively concluded that “[s]omething is happening” in antitrust cases, but the participants, like Bob Dylan’s thin man,
“don’t know what it is.”10
Kaplow’s critique is both dead on and largely irrelevant. He correctly portrays the rhetoric at stage one of the antitrust dichotomy as hollow and inadequate for its intended purpose of assessing whether the defendant possesses
market power.11 But the “Tower of Babel” analogy is wrong; no one uses that
rhetoric in the literal fashion that Kaplow criticizes. It serves as a framework
through which lawyers and judges assess the consumer impact of challenged
conduct after taking into account all of the available information. “That’s how
it goes,” in Leonard Cohen’s words, and “everybody knows.”12 While the
process would likely improve if everyone spoke openly about their reasoning
processes, current practice is hardly babble; and uprooting it, at least too
quickly, could wreak unnecessary havoc.13
8

Id.
Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 465–66
(2010). Kaplow contends:
[I]t is remarkable that the criterion by which one market definition is
deemed superior to another has received little direct attention and analysis. That is, there is no canonical operational statement of the standard
for determining what constitutes a relevant market and, a fortiori, no developed underlying rationalization for whatever the principle might be.
Id. Kaplow was not the first to criticize market definition. See Richard S. Markovits, The Limits
to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor Easterbrook, 63 TEX. L. REV. 41, 58 (1984).
10
DYLAN, supra note 1.
11
Kaplow, supra note 9, at 440 (arguing that “the market definition process should be
abandoned” because “the entire rationale for [it] is to enable an inference about market
power” but “there does not exist any coherent way to choose a relevant market without
first formulating one’s best assessment of market power”).
12
COHEN, supra note 2 (“Everybody knows that the dice are loaded / Everybody rolls
with their fingers crossed ... / That’s how it goes, everybody knows”).
13
The traditional market definition process may provide an essential framework for
determining whether particular conduct has an anticompetitive effect. In developing the
1982 merger guidelines, the then-Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division,
and respected antitrust commentator, William Baxter explained in the text of the guidelines that they intentionally divided and simplified the inquiry. Department of Justice
Antitrust Division, Symposium, 1982 Merger Guidelines, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 649, 650
(1982). “[I]n theory,” he wrote, “all the demand and supply forces relevant to the evaluation
of a merger could be incorporated in the definition of a market.” Id.
But Baxter recognized that despite its theoretic purity, an all-encompassing concept of
the market would be difficult to apply. Thirty years later, long-time Antitrust Division
economist, Greg Werden, defended Baxter’s reasoning in response to Kaplow’s critique.
9

2014]

REMEDYING ANTITRUST’S FALSE DICHOTOMY

419

The gulf between rhetoric and reality, however, is far from innocuous.
The antitrust dichotomy between market power and competitive effects is
descriptively false. The Supreme Court has required trial judges to assess
antitrust defendants’ entrepreneurial decision-making to determine whether it comports with the competitive norms set by the antitrust laws.14 The
ostensibly separate inquiries into market power and competitive effects are
really a unitary process through which the court determines an industry’s
best competitive makeup.15 Every industry is made up of realms in which
firms could compete, including the realms of pricing, quality, geographic
scope, innovation, interaction with competitors, suppliers or dealers, and
product choice. Although antitrust generally requires competition to regulate market behavior, the Court has long recognized that the law permits
cooperation or even foreclosure in some realms in order to enable rivalry
to better serve consumer interests in others.16 An industry’s optimal competitive makeup requires rivalry between firms only when it efficiently
serves consumer interests.
The critical question for an antitrust court is thus: should rivalry be required within the realm in which the defendant restrained competition? In
answering this question, the existing false rhetoric of dichotomy permits a
trial judge to choose, pretty much willy-nilly, the level of scrutiny that an
appellate court will apply to its decision.17 The district court has this power
because the unitary nature of the court’s true analysis can usually be manipulated to rest on either stage of the false dichotomy. And therein lies the rub. If
the court chooses to decide the case based on market power, it is reviewed

“The presentation of an antitrust case,” Werden wrote, “is a narrative about actual or
likely competitive effects consisting of the actors, the scene, and the action—i.e., competition and the challenged conduct. Decades of experience suggests that market delineation
often adds clarity and power to the narrative” of many (although certainly not all) antitrust cases. Gregory J. Werden, Why (Ever) Define Markets? An Answer to Professor
Kaplow, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 729, 740 (2013). He also recognized that “the tools of modern economics do not always provide a satisfactory means for assessing the likely competitive effects of a merger without resort to market delineation.” Id. When they do not,
the relevant market remains important to the substantive analysis. Even Kaplow recognized that talking about markets can assist a trial judge. Louis Kaplow, Market Definition
and The Merger Guidelines, R. INDUS. ORG., Aug. 2011, at 107, 110 n.9 (acknowledging
that “a market metaphor might not sometimes be helpful”).
14
The Supreme Court’s case law recognizes that antitrust does not compel competition in all realms. See infra Part IV.F.
15
Although prior work has strongly criticized market definition, this is the first article
to show it is inseparable from the consideration of competitive effects.
16
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984).
17
See infra note 18 and accompanying text.
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under the deferential clearly erroneous standard.18 But if the trial judge decides to analyze competitive effects, the appellate court will review the decision de novo.19
Antitrust analysis in the federal district courts is not the wasteland
Kaplow makes it out to be. Most judges do excellent work, but the complexity of many antitrust cases ensures that errors are inevitable, and the
cases’ widespread economic impact counsels against tolerating those mistakes. As the second Justice Harlan wrote in another context, labeling a
matter of significant public importance a fact-finding subject to deferential
review “obscure[s] the peculiar responsibilities resting on state and federal
courts ... and encourage[s] them to rely on easy labeling and jury verdicts
as a substitute for facing up to the tough individual problems ... involved
in every ... case.”20
This very real problem with antitrust analysis can be cured with a single
doctrinal change. Appellate courts should scrutinize all antitrust liability
questions de novo regardless of whether the district court bases its decision
on market power or competitive effects. Following Justice Harlan’s advice,
the federal appellate courts aggressively review many fact-intensive questions involving complex and socially important issues.21 Antitrust cases fit
well within this framework and should be subject to similar scrutiny.
Part I reviews the traditional dichotomy in antitrust analysis between
market structure and competitive effects. Part II explains that the most
recent merger guidelines promulgated jointly by the federal antitrust enforcement agencies have begun to question this dichotomy. Part III distinguishes Kaplow’s polemic against market definition from the critique
offered here. Kaplow accepts the traditional two-step paradigm, rejecting
18

Under the clearly erroneous standard, the reviewing court will not disturb a district
court’s decision unless after reviewing all of the evidence the reviewing court “is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States
v. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); see, e.g., Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d
182, 193 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying clearly erroneous standard), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1426
(2013); Microsoft v. United States, 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001); United States v.
Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 1997) (explaining that “[t]he definition
of the relevant market is essentially a factual question,” and “[a]s long as the district
court’s findings are plausible, we may not reverse the district court even if we would
have decided the case differently”); Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717
F.2d 1560, 1569 (11th Cir. 1983) (explaining that the “relevant product and geographic
market is a question of fact, and findings concerning the market should be overturned on
appeal only if clearly erroneous or where there is no evidence to support the finding”).
19
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 50.
20
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 498 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring in result in
part and dissenting in part).
21
See infra Part VI.B.
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only the process that courts ostensibly use at stage one.22 Part IV shows
the dichotomy is false at its core and presents the descriptive thesis that
traditional antitrust inquiries into market power and competitive effects
are inseparable. A court determines the ideal competitive makeup of the
industry and punishes firms that thwart competition in realms where it
would serve consumer interests. Part V responds to anticipated criticism,
showing that structure and effects are logically intertwined and that lower
courts appearing to follow the antitrust dichotomy are tacitly determining
the industry’s best competitive makeup. Part VI articulates and justifies
the prescriptive thesis that appellate courts should review all antitrust
decisions de novo. It shows courts have long applied probing scrutiny to
similarly fact-intensive issues under constitutional and statutory regimes
that resemble the antitrust laws in all meaningful ways.
I. ANTITRUST’S FALSE DICHOTOMY
A. The Modern Market Power-Competitive Effects Dichotomy
The paradigm of modern antitrust analysis is a two-stage analytic dichotomy. At the first stage, the court ostensibly determines if the defendant has the ability to overcome the marketplace forces that stimulate competition and typically protect consumer interests, an ability commonly
known as market power.23 After completing its first inquiry, the court is
said to move to the second stage, at which it examines competitive effects,
that is the impact of the defendant’s conduct on consumers.24
1. Stage One—Market Power
At stage one, a court supposedly identifies the competing products that
satisfy consumer demand in order to define the market, calculate the competitors’ shares, and estimate the likelihood of competitive entry and supply substitution.25 A relevant market is an observable cluster of economic
activity—a set of reasonable substitute products or services from which
22

Kaplow, supra note 9, at 441.
See infra notes 25–43 and accompanying text.
24
Id.
25
“Competitive entry” is a term reserved for entirely new participants in the market,
and supply substitution refers to the ability of companies already making related products
to shift their production to compete with the product in question. For example, in the
standard-52-card-deck playing-card market, a competitive entrant would have no prior
experience making cards, while supply substitution would occur if the manufacturer of
Old Maid cards switched to 52-card decks.
23
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consumers choose.26 The inquiry is simple in theory, asking whether consumers substitute one product for another, thereby reciprocally incentivizing each producer to strive to make its own good more valuable. Also, it is
presumed that a court can answer this question simply by finding facts
about the market.27
The firm’s market share is thought to be a vital predictor of whether it has
market power, that is, the ability to raise price profitably to the detriment of
consumers.28 If the defendants’ shares are large, the court may infer power.29
Other evidence, such as the likelihood of competitive entry or supply substitution, may undermine that inference.30 Within the paradigm, the marketdefining trial judge is thought to work much like a medical technician reading
an x-ray, examining the parameters of a market for imperfections. The defect

26

See Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 252 (1958).
Microsoft v. United States, 253 F.3d 34, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (explaining that “the
determination of a relevant market is a factual question to be resolved by the District
Court”). In the Du Pont case, for example, the Supreme Court held it could not overturn a
lower court’s relevant market finding unless the lower court applied “erroneous legal
tests ... to essential findings of fact or that the findings themselves were ‘clearly erroneous’” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 381 (1956) (“We do not try the facts of cases de novo.”).
This approach was formalized in William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market
Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939 (1981) (explaining that “[t]he
concept of market power as the setting of price in excess of marginal cost is formalized in
the ‘Lerner index,’ which measures the proportional deviation of price at the firm’s
profit-maximizing output from the firm’s marginal cost at that output”).
28
See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 17 (1984) (tying case);
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (monopolization case); TimesPicayune Publ’g Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611–13 (1953) (tying case);
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 50 (monopolization and tying); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 3.1, at 79 (3d ed.
2005) (defining market power as the defendant’s ability to “make more money by selling
its output at a higher-than-competitive price”). For ease of exposition, market power is
normally expressed in terms of profitably raising price. However, it can include any sort
of conduct that burdens consumers at the expense of the defendant firm as compared to
the situation that would prevail in a competitive market. HOVENKAMP, supra at 79 & 79
n.2. For example, market power could be exercised through lower quality, reduced
choice, or delayed innovation in addition to higher prices.
29
Herbert Hovenkamp has argued that in predatory pricing and foreclosure cases the
defendant’s market share may be directly at issue and not merely relevant because of its
correlation to market power. HOVENKAMP, supra note 28 § 3.1c, at 82–83.
30
LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK ¶ 2.6b3, at 68–70 (2006) (explaining that after calculating market
shares a court must assess barriers to entry because “[i]f firms outside the market could easily
enter the market, a high market share may not reflect a great deal of market power”).
27
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is either there or not, as a matter of fact, and appellate review is limited to determining whether the lower court’s findings are clearly erroneous.31
2. Stage Two—Consumer Harm
The objective, structural analysis of stage one is thought to be analytically distinct from the second stage of the dichotomy during which the
court determines whether the defendant’s conduct harmed consumers.32 At
this stage, the court becomes a policy analyst, sifting through subtle and
contestable economic considerations. Most market conduct has both proand anti-competitive effects; certain aspects can further the interests of
consumers, other aspects may make them worse off. These competing
effects may arise in different time frames. Immediate consumer harm may
result, for example, from higher prices, but additional revenue gained
through higher prices may fuel long-run competition to innovate new
products that benefit consumers. The impact of these competing factors
cannot be calculated precisely. A court must exercise considerable subjective judgment to determine, as a matter of law, whether a business practice
violates antitrust law. These decisions are reviewed on appeal de novo.
B. Applying the Dichotomous Analytic
The D.C. Circuit’s 2001 decision in United States v. Microsoft33 may be the
clearest illustration of the paradigmatic antitrust dichotomy. The government
alleged that Microsoft abused its market power in the operating systems market to restrain competition in the Internet browser market.34
1. Stage One—Market Power
The court required the plaintiff to establish the defendant’s market power
as a “necessary element” before considering whether anticompetitive effects
flowed from the defendant’s conduct.35 The D.C. Circuit’s Microsoft opinion
illustrated the deferential nature of stage-one review. The trial court found
that the relevant market excluded Apple computers, leaving Microsoft’s share
extremely large.36 On appeal, Microsoft argued that such a narrow market
31

Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 50–51.
Id. at 50.
33
Id. at 50–57.
34
Id. at 50.
35
Id. at 51; HOVENKAMP, supra note 28 § 1.7, at 45 (describing market structure as a
prerequisite that must be supplemented with proof of anticompetitive conduct).
36
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 52.
32
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was illogical because Mac had “competed with Windows for years” and
should not constitute a separate market “simply because the Mac OS runs on
a different microprocessor.”37 The appellate court rejected Microsoft’s argument without independent analysis, holding that it fell “far short of what is
required to challenge findings as clearly erroneous.”38
Considering Microsoft’s large market share and barriers to entry, the trial
court determined that it possessed market power.39 In rejecting Microsoft’s
appellate argument that despite its share it lacked the ability to raise price
profitably above the competitive level, the D.C. Circuit again cited the factual
nature of the inquiry, stressing that Microsoft could not prevail “because the
company does not challenge [the relevant] findings” of fact.40
2. Stage Two—Consumer Harm
When addressing Microsoft’s appellate challenges to the trial court’s
stage-two analysis, the opinion took on an entirely different tone. It carefully reexamined whether the facts supported the trial court’s conclusion
that Microsoft’s conduct, on balance, harmed consumers.41 The court’s
willingness to reexamine the facts when analyzing the competitive effects
of the defendant’s conduct is even more apparent in the sections of the
opinion overturning the district court’s holdings that Microsoft engaged in
unlawful attempted monopolization42 and tying.43
C. The Origins of the Paradigm
Although some claim a longer lineage,44 the modern antitrust dichotomy
crystallized with the publication of two early 1980s law review articles:
37

Id.
Id.
39
Id. at 54–57. In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit applied section 2 of the Sherman Act and often referred to “monopoly power” rather than “market power.” Id. The section 2 test requires
two elements that duplicate the rule-of-reason analysis: “(1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident.” Id. at 50 (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,
570–71 (1966)). Citing section 1 agreement cases interchangeably with monopolization cases,
the court made clear that the dichotomous approach is the same under both sections of the act.
Id. at 51.
40
Id. at 57.
41
Id. at 58–80.
42
Id. at 80–84.
43
Id. at 84–97.
44
Gregory J. Werden, Assigning Market Shares, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 68–72 (2002).
The author is a long-serving economist at the Antitrust Division.
38
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William Landes and Richard Posner’s Market Power in Antitrust Cases45
and Frank Easterbrook’s The Limits of Antitrust.46 The former articulated an
economic connection between market shares and market power,47 and the
latter questioned the courts’ ability to assess competitive effects, arguing
that market power should be a threshold requirement.48 Although the courts
have not adopted the reasoning in either article in total, both have been
enormously influential.49 Their theses are summarized below.
1. Market Shares and Market Power
Landes and Posner used the Lerner Index, which articulates a relationship between price and market share,50 to thrust market power to the
threshold of antitrust analysis. Market concentration is relevant, they argued, because a firm with a larger share, all else being equal, can raise
price profitably to a higher level than a firm with a smaller share.51
This conclusion rests on two intuitive economic principles. First, a
firm with a smaller market share must reduce its own output by a greater
percentage in order to increase the market price.52 For example, a firm
with a fifty percent market share, assuming rival sales are fixed, must
reduce its own output by two percent in order to decrease industry-wide
supply by one percent.53 If the firm had a seventy-five percent share, however, it could reduce its own sales by a smaller percentage and have the
same impact.54 A larger share thus makes market power—the ability to
raise price profitably—more likely.
Second, if rivals can increase capacity in response to a price increase,
the smaller the rivals’ current shares, the less significant any percentage

45

Landes & Posner, supra note 27. For a concise explanation, see HOVENKAMP, supra
note 28 § 3.1a–b, at 80–82; see also James A. Keyte, Market Definition and Differentiated
Products: The Need for a Workable Standard, 63 ANTIRUST L.J. 697, 697 n.4 (1995).
46
Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 1.
47
Landes & Posner, supra note 27, at 938.
48
Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 20–21.
49
Fred S. McChesney, Talking ‘Bout My Antitrust Generation: Competition For And
In The Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1424 (2003) (concluding that
“Easterbrook’s filters ... have exerted an important influence in antitrust thinking ... and
deservedly so”).
50
Landes & Posner, supra note 27, at 938.
51
Id. at 939–42.
52
Kaplow, supra note 9, at 451.
53
Id. (explaining that reducing total supply while demand remains constant increases
the price).
54
Id.
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increase in their sales will be on overall market supply.55 Thus the dominant firm that increases its prices will retain more sales at the higher
price.56 Again, a larger market share correlates with a greater likelihood of
market power.
Market share alone, however, cannot reveal whether a firm has market
power. To reach a definitive conclusion, the Lerner Index requires a market observer to know both (1) the elasticity of demand for the defendant’s
product and (2) the capacity of the firm’s competitors to expand their
output.57 Although these variables might be difficult to measure, each was
thought to turn on specific observable economic behavior. If enough information could be gathered, market power could be calculated precisely.
This fact-based inquiry could take place separate from any assessment of
the actual effects of the business practice challenged.
Importantly, Landes and Posner acknowledged the creative, prescriptive nature of their project.58 The then-current case law and enforcement
agency guidelines did not directly support their analysis.59 Under the Lerner Index, much larger market shares would be needed to support a finding of market power than the Court60 and the then-applicable merger
guidelines required.61 As the authors forthrightly recognized, antitrust
courts applying their analysis would have “to think far more systematically about market power than they [were then] accustomed to do[ing].”62
55

Id. at 452.
Id.
57
Landes & Posner, supra note 27, at 940–41.
58
Id. at 938–39.
59
Landes and Posner nevertheless argued that their analysis is consistent with the case
law. But it is hard to take them seriously because they appear to pick and choose the
passages they like while dismissing others as “puzzling.” Id. at 977. For example, they
describe Judge Hand’s Alcoa opinion, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148
F.2d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1945), as “in the spirit of [their] analysis” when he recognizes
foreign aluminum effects the U.S. market, but criticize it for failing to include that production in the relevant market. Landes & Posner, supra note 27, at 978–79.
60
United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272 (1966) (prohibiting a merger where the post-merger firm would possess 7.5 percent of the relevant market).
61
The 1968 guidelines used the share of the top four firms in the market as part of
the decision whether to challenge a merger. When the four-firm share exceeded seventy-five percent, it would challenge the merger if the two firms each had at least a four
percent share or if a single firm of at least a fifteen percent share sought to merge with
a firm of a one percent share or more. In less concentrated markets, the Division would
challenge mergers between firms with at least a five percent share or a single firm of at
least a twenty-five percent share that sought to acquire a firm with a one percent share
or more. See U.S. DEP’T OF J USTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1968), http://
www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.pdf.
62
Landes & Posner, supra note 27, at 956.
56
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2. The Market Power Screen
In The Limits of Antitrust, Frank Easterbrook argued that judges were
incapable of analyzing the complex economic factors driving business
decisions.63 He thus proposed that courts adopt a series of filters that
would have to be satisfied before considering anticompetitive effects.64
The first and most important filter was market power as evidenced by
market share.65 Easterbrook recommended using market power as a
threshold requirement in every case, because, without it, firms “cannot
injure competition no matter how hard they try.”66 The market, he maintained, “is better than the judicial process in discriminating the beneficial
from the detrimental.”67
Like Landes and Posner, Easterbrook did not purport to describe existing law.68 He openly sought to stop judges from evaluating the impact of a
business practice on consumers until after determining that the defendant
crossed the market power threshold.69
63

Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 11–12. Easterbrook explained that “it is fantastic to
suppose that judges and juries could” fully evaluate the economic impact of a business
practice. In addition, Easterbrook stated:
The welfare implications of most forms of business conduct are beyond our
ken. If we assembled twelve economists and gave them all the available data about a business practice, plus an unlimited computer budget, we would
not get agreement about whether the practice promoted consumers’ welfare
or economic efficiency more broadly defined.
Id.
64
Id. at 16–39.
65
Id. at 17–23.
66
Id. at 20; see Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for
Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2077 (2012) (explaining the paradigmatic view as follows: “Mergers, joint ventures, and some agreements
among competitors are harmless in competitive markets but can impose serious competitive threats in highly concentrated markets. Before those agreements can be characterized
as unlawful, the fact finder must establish either the existence of market power or the
likelihood that the conduct at issue will create such power or facilitate its exercise.”).
67
Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 21; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical
Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 503 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that “the interbrand market functions as an infinitely more efficient and more precise corrective to
[potentially anticompetitive] behavior [by firms lacking market power than antitrust
liability], rewarding the seller whose intrabrand restraints enhance consumer welfare
while punishing the seller whose control of the aftermarkets is viewed unfavorably by
interbrand consumers.”).
68
Id. at 9 (prescribing that “[t]he judge should employ some presumptions and filters
that will help to separate pro- and anti-competitive explanations. These filters would be
the alternative to the inhospitality tradition, the solution to the limits of antitrust.”).
69
Id. at 11.
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D. 1982 Merger Guidelines
When the Reagan Administration took office in 1981, the president
appointed the law professor William Baxter as Deputy Assistant Attorney
General responsible for the Antitrust Division.70 A kindred spirit of
Landes, Posner, and Easterbrook, Baxter immediately took up the task of
rewriting the antitrust enforcement agencies’ merger guidelines.71 The
effort was revolutionary.72 For the first time, the guidelines defined a market to include the products that the merging firms’ customers saw as reasonable substitutes at prevailing prices and “additional products ... if a
significant percentage of the buyers of products already included would be
likely to shift to those other products in response to a small but significant
and non-transitory increase in price.”73 This mode of analysis, known as
the “SSNIP test,” has been used ever since.74
Like the prior guidelines, the 1982 version relied on market share,75
but the thresholds set to trigger an investigation were increased significantly.76 The required market shares were thus more consistent with the

70

Lawrence J. White, Present at the Beginning of a New Era for Antitrust: Reflections 1982–1983, 16 REV. INDUS. ORG. 131, 131 (2000).
71
Id. at 131–32. The merger guidelines were originally promulgated in 1968 to provide
guidance on when the Division would challenge a merger. The guidelines were substantially
revised in 1982, 1992, and 2010. They do not have the force of law, but are relevant to the law
in two ways. First, enforcement policy must be based on the law, because the agencies do not
have the power to block a merger. They must convince a court that the merger violates the
law. Second, as experts, the agencies’ guidelines often influence courts interpreting the law.
See generally United States v. Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (allowing the consummation of a merger despite high market shares).
72
Id. (explaining that “the 1982 [merger guidelines were] so different in conceptual structure
from its predecessor that few participants or commentators seriously thought of it as a ‘revision;’
instead, we all considered it to be a new document with a new approach”).
73
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1982), http://www.justi
ce.gov/atr/hmerger/11248.pdf.
74
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
¶ 4 (2010), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf [hereinafter 2010
MERGER GUIDELINES].
75
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1982), supra note 73. The 1982 guidelines
changed the focus from the total shares of the top four firms to a market-wide concentration measure, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), that summed the squares of each
firm’s market share. Id. In this way, the distribution and size of all competitors would be
considered with greater weight apportioned to larger firms, “which probably accords with
their relative importance in any collusive interaction.” Id.
76
Id.
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Landes-Posner-Easterbrook notion that the agencies would only challenge
a merger when the new entity would likely have market power.77
E. 1992 Merger Guidelines
Ten years later, the enforcement agencies revised their guidelines and solidified market power’s status as a threshold requirement.78 The drafters emphasized that the agencies ordinarily would undertake “no further analysis”
when a proposed merger is unlikely to “significantly increase” the market
shares of the merging firms.79
F. The Perceived Importance of the Paradigm
This two-stage approach to antitrust analysis is so well engrained that
no commentator seriously questions it.80 Antitrust lawyers and economists
believe courts resolve many cases at stage one without considering competitive effects. “[T]he outcome of more cases,” according to antitrust
economist and law professor Jonathan Baker, “has surely turned on market
definition than on any other substantive issue.”81 Former Federal Trade
Commission Chairman Robert Pitofsky has thus observed that
77

Id.
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES (1992), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf.
79
Id. Hovenkamp describes the role of market definition under modern generally accepted
antitrust principals “as a prerequisite to anticompetitive performance.” HOVENKAMP, supra
note 28 § 1.7, at 45 (emphasis added) (asserting that “[s]tructure has become a necessary but
not a sufficient cause”).
Some lower courts ostensibly adopted this approach as law. See, e.g., FTC v. Freeman
Hosp., 69 F.3d 260, 268 (8th Cir. 1995) (asserting that “[t]he determination of the relevant market is a ‘necessary predicate’ to a finding of a Clayton Act violation”); Graphic
Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. ITEK Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1571 (11th Cir. 1983) (describing
proving market power as “[h]aving crossed this threshold…”).
80
Herbert Hovenkamp may come closest to seeing the dichotomy’s falsity. Herbert
Hovenkamp, Response: Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2136 (2012)
(explaining that antitrust analysis “has either developed or borrowed technical conceptions of market concentration, market power, market share, entry barriers, and economies
of scale and scope, all of which can go into an antitrust assessment of competitive effects”). Other commentators have argued antitrust analysis should include non-economic
factors. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53 B.C. L. REV.
551, 595 (2012) (asserting that antitrust should take account of a broader area of goals
than the improper exercise of market power).
81
Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129,
129 (2007). See, e.g., 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
549 (Jonathan M. Jacobson et al. eds., 6th ed. 2007) (“Defining a relevant market is often a
critical issue, and sometimes the critical issue, in an antitrust case.”).
78
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“[k]nowledgeable antitrust practitioners have long known that the most
important single issue in most enforcement actions—because so much
depends on it—is market definition.”82
II. THE 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES: UNDERMINING THE FALSE DICHOTOMY?
In 2006, the United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division (the
Division) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or the Commission)
began to question the paradigmatic dichotomy.83 Division attorneys and
economists stressed that “[t]he market definition process is not isolated
from the other analytic components,” and the agencies thus do not always
“define a market before proceeding to address other issues.”84 Rather, the
agencies use an “integrated process by which the[y] ... reach an understanding of the merger’s likely effect on competition.”85 Baker, who was then the
FTC’s Bureau of Economics Director, reported the Commission’s view that
defining a market is not a critical step in assessing the competitive impact of
a merger when the combination “can be shown to harm competition directly.”86 Adopting a res ipsa loquitur-like approach, he reasoned that if consumer harm is apparent, it must exist within a relevant market and “there is
little need to specify the market’s precise boundaries.”87
The 2010 revision to the 1992 guidelines formalized this view. Although it retained the Baxter-inspired market definition methodology, the
new drafters prefaced that section with the caveat that “[t]he measurement of market shares and market concentration is not an end in itself,
but is useful to the extent it illuminates the merger’s likely competitive
effects” and that the analysis “need not start with market definition” as it
had in each prior iteration.88
To emphasize flexibility, the new guidelines began with a list of types
of evidence that could indicate adverse competitive effects.89 Market concentration was listed as the third factor after (1) observed anticompetitive
82

Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1807 (1990); see also Lemley & McKenna, supra note 66, at
2077–78 (defining market definition as an essential aspect of antitrust analysis).
83
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES 15 (2006), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.pdf.
84
Id. at 5.
85
Id.
86
Jonathan B. Baker, Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis, 5 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 347, 351 (1997).
87
Id.
88
2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 74, at 7.
89
Id. at 3–4.
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effects in consummated mergers and (2) direct comparison based on experience.90 The drafters also increased the thresholds through which market
share alone would trigger greater scrutiny,91 effectively increasing the
cases in which the enforcement agencies would have to use other means of
assessing a merger.
The 2010 guidelines are subject to varying interpretations.92 Perhaps the
drafters intended only to explore different avenues to determine market
power within the existing dichotomy, believing evidence of anticompetitive
effects could also be used to predict the merged firm’s power if particularly
good evidence were available. Alternatively, however, the new guidelines
can be read to recognize that market power is but one consideration in a
broader analysis that invariably requires a unitary assessment of the optimal competitive makeup of a particular industry.93
III. LOUIS KAPLOW’S CRITIQUE OF MARKET DEFINITION
Perhaps inspired by the new guidelines, Kaplow launched what he described as “a wholesale assault on the core logic of the [market definition]
methodology,” arguing convincingly that the process hinders a court’s ability to
determine whether a defendant has market power.94 Taking the paradigmatic
90

Id. at 3.
Id. at 19.
92
See Kaplow, supra note 13, at 2, 19. Kaplow states:
[T]he new Guidelines’ modest statements launch the evolution of merger review (further) down a slippery slope and therefore are dangerous,
threatening to throw the process and court scrutiny into disarray. From
this perspective, what matters less are the words themselves; reading
between the lines, a more momentous shift may be underway.
Id. at 16.
Some commentators expressed concern that alternatives to standard market definition
were too uncertain and untested. See Dennis W. Carlton, Revising the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 619, 620–21 (2010). For links to comments on
the original questions issued by the DOJ and FTC in the Guidelines revision process and
to comments on the proposed revision (which is close to the promulgated version), see
FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES REVIEW PROJECT (2010),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/hmg/index.shtml and FED. TRADE COMM’N,
Federal Trade Commission Seeks Views on Proposed Update of the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines #340, FTC File No. P092900 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/com
ments/hmgrevisedguides/index.shtm.
93
2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 74, at 2 (“The Agencies consider any reasonably available and reliable evidence to address the central question of whether a
merger may substantially lessen competition.”).
94
Kaplow, supra note 9, at 440. Kaplow’s critique spans three law review articles that
were published in 2010 and 2011. See supra notes 6, 9 & 13.
91
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rhetoric seriously, Kaplow concluded that antitrust judges are irrationally
employing a counterproductive tool.95 He never considers, however, the possibility that courts may not be following the antitrust dichotomy.96 This section summarizes Kaplow’s argument and then compares it to a similar misunderstanding of the judicial role in another area of law.
A. Understanding Kaplow’s Critique
Kaplow contends that the practice of defining markets by calculating
shares to draw inferences of market power is incoherent.97 Markets cannot
be defined in a rational way and even if they could, he shows, market
shares would not convey useful information.98
Kaplow first demonstrated that the process of examining cross elasticity
between products–the heart of traditional market definition–illogically requires courts to search for irrelevant information.99 Knowing what products,
if any, a firm’s customers would adopt if price increased is useless information.100 The market elasticity of a firm’s products is the only relevant
issue. “All [a firm] cares about,” in deciding whether to increase price,
Kaplow explained, “is the rate at which [its customers would] reduce their
purchases of its own product as the price rises.”101 The court thus has no
need to determine the products to which consumers might switch in order
to assess market power.
Even worse, Kaplow contended, the market definition process requires
a court to disregard known, relevant information.102 With respect to virtually any potential substitute, a court will know that (1) it has some impact
on the defendant’s pricing decisions, but (2) less than a perfect substitute
would have.103 Paradigmatic market definition, however, is binary. It only
permits the court to either include the partial substitute in the market as if
95

Kaplow, supra note 9, at 515.
Although rejecting market definition, Kaplow does not question the bifurcated
market power-competitive effects dichotomy. See Kaplow, supra note 6, at 276 (asserting
that market power is critical issue); Kaplow, supra note 13, at 4 (asserting that “[f]or
economists the message is to continue or accelerate work on other ways of determining
market power”); Kaplow, supra note 9, at 502 (recognizing need to find the best way to
measure market power in various industries).
97
Kaplow, supra note 9, at 516.
98
Id. at 515.
99
Id. at 449, 481–85.
100
Kaplow, supra note 13, at 5 (“[T]he formula properly depicts market power regardless of the particulars of demand substitution.”).
101
Kaplow, supra note 9, at 449.
102
Id. at 516.
103
Id. at 515.
96

2014]

REMEDYING ANTITRUST’S FALSE DICHOTOMY

433

it were perfect, overstating its impact on price, or leave it out and understate its impact.104 Either way, the court would ignore what it knows to be
true—that the partial substitute has a limited impact on the defendant’s
pricing decisions.105
Kaplow thus rejected the traditional market definition process entirely
and argued for using the best available evidence to estimate market power.106 To illustrate his point, Kaplow posited a hypothetical merger between
orange juice companies. Under the standard paradigm, one would ask
whether to include, say, grapefruit juice, in the relevant market.107 To make
that decision, however, the court would need to have a sense of whether a
non-orange juice limited the ability of the merging firms to raise price.108
“But,” Kaplow reasoned, “if we have already reached th[e] conclusion [that
orange juice drinkers would switch to another juice], we are done.”109 The
merging orange juice producers obviously lack market power. There is no
value, according to Kaplow, in the standard exercise of deciding whether
grapefruit juice is within the relevant market and calculating shares based
on that decision.110 We can just rely on whatever evidence convinced us
that OJ drinkers would switch to grapefruit juice.
Second, Kaplow argued that even if there were a logical method to define the market and determine accurate shares, that data point would be
virtually useless.111 Within the existing paradigm, the search for market
power is intended to determine whether the defendant can harm consumers. But market shares, Kaplow showed, provide virtually no information
about either (1) how much market power a defendant possessed or (2) how
much would be necessary to enable the defendant to injure its customers.112 The answer to both questions logically requires reference to the
104

Id. at 472.
Id. at 487; accord Lemley & McKenna, supra note 66, at 2098 (explaining that
“[t]he current approach to market definition draws an arbitrary line when what we need is
a continuum that reflects the partial differentiation of products and differences in the cost
and convenience of those products”).
Kaplow further argues that the hypothetical monopolist test in the merger guidelines
does not help define rational markets and often produces worse results. Kaplow, supra
note 13, at 10–15; Kaplow, supra note 9, at 480.
106
Kaplow, supra note 6, at 275.
107
Kaplow, supra note 9, at 505–06.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 506.
110
Id. at 480 (traditional market definition more likely to mask than elucidate).
111
Kaplow, supra note 6, at 275.
112
Id. at 255 (“[T]he market share (even in a properly defined market) does not allow
even a rough approximation of the extent of market power.”); id. at 257 (“[T]he resulting
105
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defendant’s ability to raise price, and any answer expressed in terms of
market share “fails to address either question directly and does not appear
capable of providing a meaningful indirect answer.”113
Kaplow acknowledged the economic correlation between market share
and market power as demonstrated by the Lerner Index. But he argued that
expressing power in terms of share is “a category mistake.”114 A car’s top
speed, he analogized, cannot be expressed in terms of its engine displacement, even though that measure is “an important factor bearing on” a car’s
potential speed.115 In both cases, the unit of measurement is not powerful
enough to serve as the sole criterion for answering the question asked. Too
many other relevant factors come into play. As Kaplow put it, the data
point is “blatantly not in the terms (units) put by the question.”116
Kaplow’s attack is powerful and his logic compelling. If judges have
been following the two-stage paradigm—(1) using market shares as a
proxy for market power and (2) ignoring competitive effects unless market
shares are big enough—then those judges have been horribly misguided.
B. An Illustrative Analogy Revealing Kaplow’s Error
Kaplow concludes that courts act irrationally when they define markets,117
but there is another possibility. Judges may be approaching the problem in a
way that is very different from what the antitrust dichotomy predicts.
A helpful analogy can be found in Bruce Ackerman’s Property and the
Constitution,118 which analyzed a similar divergence between the paradigmatic theory of regulatory takings and apparently out-of-sync case law.
Ackerman attributed the disconnect to the commentators’ use of an alluring analytic method that differed from the approach that the courts actually used.119 He called this method “scientific policymaking,”120 describing
it as developing a comprehensive view of the law’s goal and a special
technical language designed to pursue it.121

answers for a given market share vary too much for market share to be used even as a
crude approximation” of market power.).
113
Id. at 257.
114
Id. at 253.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id. at 275.
118
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 2–3 (1977).
119
Id. at 168.
120
Id. at 23–24.
121
Id. at 10–11.
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A legal analyst of the scientific-policy-making type, Ackerman explained, “manipulates technical legal concepts so as to illuminate ... the
relationship between disputed legal rules and the Comprehensive View he
understands to govern the legal system.”122 For example, Jeremy Bentham
was a scientific policymaker whose comprehensive view was that legal
rules should be set to best maximize utility.123
Commentators like Landes, Posner, Easterbrook, and Kaplow advance
the comprehensive view that antitrust law should limit the ability of firms to
raise price profitably above the competitive level. Also, they use the technical language of economics—the Lerner Index, elasticity, demand, and
supply substitution—to pursue that goal. This approach fits comfortably
within the scientific policymaking framework.
Ackerman argued that scientific policymaking can create “the basis for
a body of ... law that is both powerful and deeply grounded.”124 In takings
cases, it “seem[ed] familiar[] and ... sensible.”125 Yet, the results it predicted bore “very little relationship to the [existing legal] rules.”126
The same problem infects antitrust law. As Kaplow demonstrated, the
existing legal rules of market definition bear little relation to those that a
court would pursue were it truly interested in assessing the defendant’s
market power as a threshold issue.127 In such a case, as Ackerman put it,
there are two possibilities: “either ... the judges have been strikingly inept
or ... they have been thinking about [the] law in a way that is strikingly
different from that characteristic of the Scientific Policymaker.”128 In the
takings area, Ackerman concluded that courts were using ordinary observers’ subjective understanding of the scope of property rights rather than
the criteria advanced by the scientific policy-makers.129
Antitrust courts have similarly pursued a “strikingly different” path
from the comprehensive view that market power is a threshold requirement that must be proven before a court may consider the effect of a defendant’s conduct on consumers.130 The following section explains that
122

Id. at 15.
Id. at 11.
124
Id. at 24 (addressing government compensation for reducing property value
through regulation).
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Kaplow, supra note 6, at 275.
128
ACKERMAN, supra note 118, at 24–25.
129
Id. at 168.
130
Tellingly, in discussing the Lerner Index and market power, Herbert Hovenkamp’s
leading treatise fails to cite a single Supreme Court case and includes no source at all
prior to Landes’s and Posner’s 1981 article. HOVENKAMP, supra note 28 § 3.1, at 79 n.2.
123
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this alternative requires the court to determine the best competitive makeup
of an industry. Once that question is answered, the result is straightforward.
If the defendant restrains competition in a realm that should be subjected to
rivalry, it violates the antitrust laws; otherwise, it does not.
IV. DETERMINING COMPETITIVE MAKEUP: WHAT COURTS DO WHEN THEY
SAY THEY ARE DEFINING MARKETS
The competitive makeup of an industry is a roadmap to the realms of
business behavior in which antitrust law requires rivalry and those in
which it does not. For example, rivalry is generally required in the realm
of short-run price setting.131 A firm with a patent on a superior technology,
however, may block competition to provide its patented product and charge
supra-competitive prices without running afoul of antitrust law.132 Rivalry
thus does not regulate the short-run unilateral pricing realm when a superior
patented technology drives the market.133 This is true despite the patent
holder’s market power. The antitrust dichotomy cannot explain why this
type of market power does not count. Under the competitive makeup approach, however, the answer is simple—the best makeup of an industry
driven by a superior patented technology permits foreclosure in the realm
of short-run pricing of the patented product. Despite some consumer harm,
If courts were actually searching for market power in this way, one would expect a longer
trail. In a recent article, Hovenkamp argued that with respect to innovation, “market
power assessment will probably never do a good job ... because innovation is so badly
behaved, often producing completely unanticipated results.” Hovenkamp, supra note 80,
at 2135. Hovenkamp notes:
[A] problem with traditional market definition approaches to power is
that they tend to lump [distinguishable products] into the same market,
ignoring the differences between them. By contrast, a problem with direct measurements based on observed customer behavior is that, although they account more fully for current product differences, they do
not take innovation mobility into account.
Id. at 2148.
131
See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 48 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940)) (explaining that “‘[u]nder the Sherman
Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is
illegal per se’”).
132
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013) (explaining that a “patent owner [may be able] to charge a higher-than-competitive price for the patented product”
without violating the antitrust laws); see United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476,
490 (1926) (permitting a patent holder on a single product to impose resale price maintenance when those agreements were per se illegal on unpatented products).
133
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231; Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. at 490.
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foreclosure in this realm stimulates innovation in the future that benefits
consumers more than the short-run high prices hurt them.
The singular relevant question for an antitrust court is whether the defendant thwarted competitive forces in a realm in which rivalry efficiently
regulates market conduct. An industry’s best competitive makeup is the
one in which rivalry is compelled in those realms that antitrust can regulate efficiently, but no others.134
Knowing whether a defendant has market power may be relevant to an
industry’s competitive makeup. But power alone does not convey much
information. Firms are often permitted to exercise power—a monopolist
for example can profitably charge prices above the competitive level with
no antitrust repercussions—and a lack of market power does not necessarily insulate a defendant from liability when a plausible theory points to
consumer harm.135 Competitive makeup is thus a superior tool to the paradigmatic dichotomy.
This section flushes out the competitive makeup concept and then
shows, perhaps surprisingly, that the Supreme Court—albeit without using
the term competitive makeup—has instructed the lower courts to apply a
method of analysis that looks just like it.136
A. Distinguishing Competitive from Non-Competitive Realms
The notion that antitrust law does not require rivalry in all realms of
business behavior is not new. As Easterbrook explained, “[p]art of the
difficulty in antitrust comes from ambiguity in what we mean by competition.”137 In each industry, firms conduct business in a unique mix of
rivalrous, cooperative, and potentially foreclosable realms.138 The noncompetitive realms are efficient despite competitive restraints because
they enable rivalry to serve consumer interests in other realms.
To illustrate the point, Easterbrook explained that “[t]he Chicago
Board of Trade perhaps the closest of modern markets to the textbook ideal
[of a market governed by rivalry], has a sheaf of rules and cooperative
134

Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 1.
See infra Part IV.F.4.a (discussing the per se rule); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 470–79 (1992) (holding that copy machine manufacturer lacking market power in the copier market may nonetheless violate the antitrust
laws for limiting the sale of spare parts for its machines).
136
See infra Part IV.F.
137
Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 13.
138
Id. at 1 (explaining that “[e]very market entails substantial cooperation over some
domain in order to facilitate competition elsewhere”).
135

438

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:413

arrangements that reduce the cost of competition.”139 If an antitrust court
simply tried to move each industry closer to the textbook model, “it is sure
to be wrong a great deal of the time.”140
B. Neoclassical v. Austrian Economics
Easterbrook’s solution was a market power filter that would block
courts from intervening in markets unless the defendants controlled a large
share.141 Using market power to limit antitrust analysis is consistent with
neoclassical economics. Prices are viewed as an objectively determinable
function of production costs, and the optimal price is generally thought to
be the marginal cost of production.142 If the market structure indicated the
defendant could price above that cost-based measure, a firm had power
and would violate the antitrust laws if it used that power to harm consumers. But when a firm had a small share, a judge could rule for the defendant
without assessing the impact of the defendant’s conduct on consumers.
Although the structural factors necessary to predict market power may not
be obvious, a court has a better chance of determining them based on objective information than it has of predicting whether particular business
practices would harm consumers. Also, within a neoclassical economic
worldview, without market power the firm simply could not inflict enough
harm on consumers to justify the cost of antitrust intervention.143 So, the
court has no need to go further.
139

Id.
Id. at 2. Economic research confirms Easterbrook’s point. Consumer welfare is
likely maximized by a mixed realm of competition and cooperation, rather than either an
atomistic or a monopolistic one. For the classic text on this topic, see EDWARD H.
CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLIST COMPETITION (1933). See also CHRISTINA
BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PROMOTING
LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 9–10 (2012); JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MICROECONOMICS:
THEORY & APPLICATIONS WITH CALCULUS 483 (2008); THE MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
REVOLUTION IN RETROSPECT (Steven Brakman & Ben J. Heijdra eds., 2004); JEAN TIROLE,
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 274–95 (1988). For a simple graphical analysis,
see Cost and Revenue for Monopoly and Monopolistic Competition, WOLFRAM
DEMONSTRATIONS PROJECT, http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/CostAndRevenueForMono
polyAndMonopolisticCompetition/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).
141
Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 14–39.
142
FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (describing the role of the
market as “advanc[ing] social welfare by ensuring the provision of desired goods and
services to consumers at a price approximating the marginal cost of providing them”).
143
As Deven Desai and Spencer Waller explain, “[t]he rise of the Chicago School as the
prevailing economic discourse for antitrust reinforced the focus on price theory to the
exclusion of most other factors. It relegated business discourse to the fringes of the profession of antitrust, whether practiced by the liberal or conservative wings of the discipline.”
140
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Although Kaplow called for taking account of all available information to determine market power, he did not question the neoclassical
economic underpinnings of the antitrust dichotomy.144 Courts could continue to use price theory to predict a market power threshold so long as
they discarded the fiction that market share analysis was a useful way to
answer that threshold question. But Kaplow ignored the fact that a firm’s
ability to raise price profitably—no less than a firm’s market share—
provides insufficient information to enable a court to draw a reasonable
inference about whether the defendant harmed consumers in a way that
should violate the antitrust laws.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not rested its antitrust decisions on either
Easterbrook’s or Kaplow’s dichotomies. Instead, the Court’s analysis
reflects an aspect of the Austrian school of economics that rejects both the
idea that prices can be derived from costs and that a firm’s ability to raise
price profitably is inherently suspect.145 Austrian economics posits that
prices arise out of a dynamic process of individual entrepreneurial decisions.146 An analyst thus cannot focus objectively on costs and price. The
legitimacy of business conduct must be assessed subjectively given the
preference of antitrust law to use rivalry to advance consumer interests.147
As circumstances evolve and change, entrepreneurial actors seek profit
opportunities.148 One cannot assume a given product should be sold at its
marginal cost or even the price that would prevail if multiple sellers were
offering identical versions of that product within a defined geographic
area. Prices exceeding marginal cost often benefit consumers and do not
violate the antitrust laws.149 Entrepreneurial actions should contravene
Deven R. Desai & Spencer Waller, Brands, Competition, and the Law, 2010 BYU L.
REV. 1425, 1465–66.
144
See generally Kaplow, supra note 6.
145
United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974) (quoting Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1961)) (“[S]tatistics concerning
market share and concentration, while of great significance, were not conclusive indicators of anticompetitive effects ... ‘only a further examination of the particular market–its
structure, history and probable future–can provide the appropriate setting for judging the
probable anticompetitive effect of the merger.’”).
146
BETTINA B. GREAVES, HUMAN ACTION 329 (1996).
147
See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
148
Cf. FTC v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 46 (D.D.C. 1998) (quoting FTC v.
Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128, 1132 (D.D.C. 1986) (explaining that determining “the
relevant market in the end is ‘a matter of business reality—[]of how the market is perceived
by those who strive for profit in it,’” and thus the court must “take into account the economic
and commercial realities of the [particular] pharmaceutical industry”).
149
Lemley & McKenna, supra note 66, at 2097 (explaining that the notion of marginal
cost makes little sense in multi-product industries where the successful products must cover
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antitrust only if a firm’s dynamic decisions blunt competition in realms in
which rivalry would best serve consumer interests.150
The Supreme Court appears to recognize, like the Austrians, that judges can comprehend basic entrepreneurial instincts to: (1) seek out profit
opportunities; (2) avoid competition that would undermine profit; and (3)
use opportunities for profit to drive competition.151 The Court’s reliance on
a “rudimentary understanding of economics”152 that is widely accessible
links directly to the Austrian insight. Intuitive knowledge, although rudimentary in some sense, can enable a judge to assess subjectively whether a
given competitive restraint promotes consumer welfare or detracts from it.
C. Judicial Competence
Easterbrook recognized the importance of an industry’s competitive
makeup.153 He favored the antitrust dichotomy, however, because he believed
that courts were incapable of assessing whether competition should govern in
a particular realm.154 “[I]t is fantastic to suppose,” he contended, “that judges
and juries could ... evaluat[e a business practice]. The welfare implications of
most forms of business conduct are beyond our ken.”155 Even businesspersons, he thought, generally cannot explain how the market operates.156 A
judge who tried to evaluate the extent to which a business practice harmed
consumers, Easterbrook concluded, would be “at sea.”157
the costs of unsuccessful ones); Hovenkamp, supra note 80, at 2140 (“[I]n many IP-rich
markets, the ratio of fixed to variable costs is extremely high, and marginal cost measures
only variable cost,” creating an “illusion of market power” based on standard analytical
tools.). Even the notion that prices always tend to move toward marginal cost appears to be
wrong. Mark Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293, 315–18 (1984) (showing that even
in many seller markets prices do not invariably tend toward marginal cost).
150
JESÚS HUERTA DE SOTO, THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL: MARKET ORDER AND
ENTREPRENEURIAL CREATIVITY 85–86 (2008).
151
See infra IV.F.
152
Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 757.
153
See Easterbrook, supra note 16.
154
Id. at 10–13.
155
Id. at 10.
156
Id. at 5 (arguing that “sometimes no one knows” why a business practice succeeds). But see id. at 11 (recognizing that economists could reasonably assess market
practices by “resort[ing] to clues and shortcuts [and] us[ing] their economic knowledge of
other markets to draw inferences about this one,” but concluding that judges could not
apply these techniques in the context of the then-existing law).
157
Id. at 2. Although this Part explains that the Supreme Court has generally expressed more confidence in the courts’ abilities than Easterbrook, there was a period in
the mid-Twentieth Century when the Court appeared to agree. For example, in United
States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), ironically a case with which
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The Austrian School, by contrast, believes that the judiciary can meaningfully assess competition’s value within particular market realms.158
Economic reasoning, the Austrians recognized, is universal and unspecialized.159 Everyone participating in an economy as a producer or consumer
has the ability to make and assess entrepreneurial decisions.160 A nonexpert’s “inner reflection ... is made possible,” Austrian economist Jesús
Huerta de Soto has explained, “by the fact that in economics (like no other
science) the researcher enjoys the privilege of having the same nature as
those observed, a situation which provides them with extremely valuable
first-hand knowledge.”161
To illustrate the distinction between a neoclassical and an Austrian approach, imagine a drug market consisting of two brand name drugs and
generic competitors. Assuming all of the market shares were relatively
small, neoclassical economics would rule out antitrust intervention on the
ground that if any drug company attempted to price its drug above the
competitive level for an extended period, it would reduce its profits and
thus be forced to reverse course. If brand-name drug owners consistently
charged higher prices, Easterbrook would urge the law to ignore the issue
as beyond the ken of antitrust judges. Kaplow would require detailed economic analysis.162 The Austrian School would recognize that a judge is
Easterbrook disagreed, see Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 22, the Court rejected the
argument that competition should not govern in a particular realm of the grocery industry
because Congress must make the
decision ... to sacrifice competition in one portion of the economy for
greater competition in another portion.... [C]ourts are ill-equipped and illsituated for such decisionmaking. To analyze, interpret, and evaluate the
myriad of competing interests and the endless data that would surely be
brought to bear on such decisions, and to make the delicate judgment on
the relative values to society of competitive areas of the economy, the
judgment of the elected representatives of the people is required.
Topco, 405 U.S. at 611–12.
158
The Austrian School’s seminal work is CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS
191–225 (James Dingwall & Bert F. Hoselitz trans., 1871), available at http://mises.org
/Books/Mengerprinciples.pdf (addressing a theory of price in chapter five). For an accessible summary of Menger’s ideas as well as more recent work by Austrian economists,
see JESÚS HUERTA DE SOTO, supra note 150, at 85–86 (comparing the Austrian School
with the Neoclassical School).
159
HUERTA DE SOTO, supra note 150, at 16–17, 73.
160
Id. at 16–17.
161
Id. at 42.
162
Kaplow claims that regardless of a judge’s economic acumen, market power determinations cannot be made intuitively because nothing about “the analysis is sensory; ‘markets’ as the term is used in this context are pure abstractions.” Kaplow, supra note 9, at 507.
“[N]othing one can view (that is, other than data, reports of consumer behavior, and so
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capable of (1) understanding the phenomenon that leads some drug users
to pay more for a branded drug that is otherwise identical to a generic and
(2) using antitrust appropriately to address potential consumer harm.163
The following sections show the courts adhere more closely to the Austrian approach than to any version of the antitrust dichotomy.
D. The Terms Used to Define Competitive Makeup
The term competitive makeup has been chosen to contrast with the
more common phrase competitive structure. The latter term suggests an
objective, fixed underpinning like the skeleton of a body or the girders in a
building. The term makeup is intended to suggest a more malleable subjective concept that, whether selected intentionally or developed organically, is not fixed but can be readily changed more or less without structural alterations. The competitive makeup of an industry is to its
competitive structure what the psychic makeup is to the skeletal structure
in a human body, and the process of determining an industry’s best competitive makeup differs from simply observing market behavior as drawing differs from tracing. A court must take account of the dimensions on
which firms optimally should compete and those on which they should be
permitted to cooperate164 or foreclose competition.165 A critical question
will always be whether immediate short-run competition (typically on
price) or longer-run competition (generally aimed at innovation) would
best serve antitrust’s goal of advancing consumer welfare through competition in a particular industry at a particular time.166 Secondarily, questions

forth),” he argues, would illuminate “in the literal sense whether one particular market
definition is ‘closer’ to the truth than another. Among other things, one would first have to
generate an image of the truth, which is precisely the point of this argument.” Id.
163
See generally MENGER, supra note 158.
164
Cooperation often occurs on standards, but courts have also recognized it may be
pro-competitive in certain instances. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 U.S. 585, 605–07, 610 (1984) (marketing of ski lift tickets found to be pro-competitive
among competitors); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (cooperating firms found pro-competitive in commodities market).
165
Property rights isolate particular assets from competition. The patent system is the
most obvious example, but real property and chattels have the same effect of enabling
only one firm, the owner, to compete using particular property. Steven Semeraro, Property’s End: Why Competition Policy Should Limit the Right of Publicity, 43 CONN. L. REV.
753, 792–818 (2011).
166
Cf. United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 664 (1964) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring to “the subtle and necessarily speculative
questions involved in assessing the short-term and long-term effects of this merger ...”).
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may arise about whether industry participants should compete on packages
of goods or services,167 quality,168 or the choices provided to consumers.169
Within this alternate framework, defining the competitive market is a
creative, subjective process as opposed to an observational, objective one. A
finding that consumers substitute one product for another or that a defendant
can profitably raise price is relevant but hardly definitive.170 A firm’s conduct also communicates its expectation that what it does will have substantial
market effect. Also, competitors and consumers will inform the judge’s
understanding of how the market works.171 Judges meld this information
with their own intuitive understanding of how entrepreneurs seek profit in
order to determine an industry’s best competitive makeup.
E. An Illustrative Example
Before examining the case law, this section presents an example illustrating
the tradeoff between short and longer-term benefits that courts must make in
determining an industry’s best competitive makeup. Understanding the nature
167

See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459–60 (1986) (holding that
in the dental industry a “refusal to compete with respect to the package of services ... no
less than a refusal to compete with respect to the price term of an agreement, impairs the
ability of the market to advance social welfare ...”).
168
See, e.g., Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605–07, 610 (noting harm from the unavailability
of all-Aspen ticket, that deprived consumers of the ability to “make their own choice on
these matters of quality”).
169
See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984)
(finding that athletic association’s actions “can be viewed as procompetitive” because
they “widen consumer choice ...”).
170
Lemley and McKenna capture the flavor of the competitive makeup inquiry in
their description of how a court should approach market definition in a case involving a
defendant’s intellectual property rights.
The general point is that the competitive costs of IP rights vary with the
extent to which they enable the owners of those rights to exclude close
substitutes, and courts should therefore conceive of competition in the
IP space in terms of the quality of available substitutes.... Indeed, there
may be multiple dimensions to the differentiation, including price,
quality, and (for IP goods) brand association.
Lemley & McKenna, supra note 66, at 2102.
171
Cf. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2236 (2013) (using evidence that patent
owner agreed to pay alleged infringer large sum to drop its challenge to patent indicates
that patent holder has the ability to charge supra-competitive prices); Rothery Storage &
Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (quoting Brown
Shoe v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)) (explaining that “[t]he ‘industry or
public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic’ unit matters because we
assume that economic actors usually have accurate perceptions of economic realities”).
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of this critical tradeoff helps reveal the competitive makeup assessment that is
often masked in the case law by the rhetoric of dichotomy.
Pursuant to the regulatory statutes governing the provision of Internet
access, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) determined
whether Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that already had access to residential property—legacy telephony and cable TV companies—should be
compelled to allow competitive ISPs to use the physical connections to
individual homes in order to compete.172 Although the FCC’s decisions
are opaque and may turn, in part, on non-economic concerns, the differing
competitive makeup of the two industries can rationalize the Commission’s differing conclusions.
On the telephony side, the FCC enabled short-run price competition by
requiring legacy telephone service providers to permit competitive ISPs to
use their telephone wires.173 The Commission likely concluded that innovation in telephony markets would be adequate without the additional profits
that could be garnered if legacy providers were permitted to foreclose competitive ISPs. Competition, the FCC concluded, could productively regulate
this realm, and the best competitive makeup of the traditional telephone industry thus included rivalry between the legacy provider and competitive ISPs
to provide Internet access over telephone wires.174
In contrast, the FCC favored innovation rivalry over short-run price
competition in the cable industry, allowing cable companies to foreclose
competition by denying ISPs access to their cable lines.175 As the Supreme
Court put it, the Commission found that “changed market conditions”—
namely that Internet access was already provided competitively when the
cable companies sought to enter the market—“warrant[ed] different treatment” of telephone and cable companies.176 Presumably, the Commission
compared the benefit from (1) spurring the cable companies to innovate by
allowing them to avoid competition, on the one hand, and (2) the price
competition that would result if ISPs were allowed to use the cable lines,
172

47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (West 2014).
In re Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability,
13 FCC Rcd. 24,012, 24,030–31 (1998) (classifying DSL service as a telecommunications service); In re Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Comm’ns Rules & Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 964 (1986).
174
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-458 (1996) (stating that the purpose of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is to “provide for a pro-competitive, de-regulatory national policy
framework designed to accelerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced telecommunications and information technologies and services to all Americans”).
175
In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable & Other
Facilities, 17 FCC Rcd. 4798, 4826 (2002).
176
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 1001 (2005).
173
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on the other. This calculation may have been accurate for two reasons.
First, as the Court recognized, by the time cable companies sought to enter
the ISP market, telephony access provided existing competition. The telephone companies initially had no ISP competitors. Second, the cable companies needed to exert greater innovative effort to perfect Internet access
over their lines. The best competitive makeup of the cable industry thus
did not require rivalry to provide Internet access over cable wires. Rather a
cooperative arrangement between the cable companies and selective ISP
competitors, or one in which cable companies foreclosed all competition
over their lines, constituted better competitive makeups of the cable industry than one that compelled rivalry over those lines.
F. Case Law Support
Case after case reveals that antitrust courts, as the competitive makeup approach requires, trade off the benefits of short and longer-run competition to
determine the realms in which rivalry should be required.177 From the earliest
cases, the courts have recognized that competitive restraints were not all bad.178
Although consumers benefit immediately from the lower-priced and higherquality goods and services that result from rivalry in the marketplace, consumers also benefit when protecting firms from competition in one realm enables
them to compete efficiently in another realm.179
Because blunting short-run price competition can spur innovation, the
courts have permitted firms with market power to engage in anti-consumer
conduct.180 A monopolist, for example, may charge a price exceeding the

177

See, e.g., id. at 1000–02 (discussing why initially regulating DSL providers as
common carriers promoted competition, while doing the same for cable modem service
providers would do the opposite); High-Speed Access, 17 FCC Rcd. at 4826.
178
See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Mitchel
v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 350 (Q.B. 1711).
179
Polk Bros v. Forest City, Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Antitrust law is designed to ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation and competition, not to require all economic actors to compete full tilt at every moment.”); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898) (“Contracts for the partial restraint of trade are upheld, not
because they are advantageous to the individual with whom the contract is made, ... but because it is for the benefit of the public at large that they should be enforced.”).
180
See, e.g., Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant
charging of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the
free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short
period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that
produces innovation and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the
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competitive level without violating the antitrust laws, no matter how conclusive the evidence that the supra-competitive price harms consumers.181
Similarly, some non-pricing practices that foreclose competition do not
violate the antitrust laws even when the defendant has market power. As
the Supreme Court explained in the early Board of Trade of Chicago decision, restraints on competition in one realm may regulate and therefore
enhance competition in another realm.182 The Board surely had market
power, and its rule limiting certain trades unquestionably harmed those
who sought to make the prohibited trades.183 Yet, the Court ruled in favor
of the defendant.184 As Justice Brandeis put it, “[t]he true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition.”185
The antitrust dichotomy cannot explain the results in cases such as
Board of Trade of Chicago that permit defendants with market power to
harm consumers. But the competitive makeup approach can. Monopolists
may set high prices or foreclose certain forms of competition because
short-run harm to consumers incentivizes consumer-friendly innovation
and competitive entry in the longer run.
Just as proof of market power, no matter how extreme, and harm to
consumers does not invariably lead to antitrust liability, the absence of
market power or consumer harm does not always insulate a firm from
liability.186 The Supreme Court has made this point repeatedly through the
per se doctrine.187 A naked agreement to fix prices is thus per se illegal
regardless of whether the plaintiff can prove that the defendants have
market power or that consumers have been harmed.188
Again, the antitrust dichotomy cannot explain the per se decisions. But
the competitive makeup approach can. The best competitive makeup of
possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an
element of anticompetitive conduct.”).
181
Id. The Court has also favorably cited Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347
(Q.B. 1711), which applies a similar balance to a restraint in the sale of a non-intellectual,
property-based business. See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
688–89 (1978); accord Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 280–81.
182
Bd. of Trade of Chi., 246 U.S. at 237.
183
In particular, the Court mentions the “four or five warehouseman in Chicago” that
together had a monopoly on the trade before the restrictions were put in place. Id. at 237.
184
Id. at 241.
185
Id. at 238.
186
See infra Part IV.F.4.a.
187
See infra Part IV.F.
188
See infra Part IV.F.
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most industries requires each firm to make its own decisions about output,
prices, and the markets in which it will compete. Antitrust law permits
cooperative behavior only when firms sufficiently integrate their operations. Even though there may be no market power or short-run competitive
injury, naked horizontal agreements create the risk of undermining consumer welfare in the longer run.
The following sub-sections review the case law in some detail to show
that these situations are not mere exceptions to the antitrust dichotomy. On
the contrary, courts tradeoff shorter- and longer-run gains and losses, albeit sometimes tacitly, in every case to determine an industry’s best competitive makeup.189 Only after analyzing these tradeoffs can a court meaningfully determine whether the defendant’s conduct restrained competition
that should have existed given that industry’s best competitive makeup.
1. Early Case Law
This subsection compares three early cases and demonstrates how the
competitive makeup approach explains the results, but the antitrust dichotomy does not.
a. Mitchel v. Reynolds
The early English restraint-of-trade decision in Mitchel v. Reynolds,190
cited favorably by the U.S. Supreme Court,191 typifies the competitive
makeup approach. In Mitchel, the court upheld an agreement prohibiting a
baker from competing in a particular geographic area for five years after
the sale of an ongoing business.192 Although restraints of trade were prohibited under English law, the court explained that when a restraint is part
of a pro-competitive contract, “the particular circumstances” must be reviewed carefully before assessing the restraint’s lawfulness.193
The Mitchel court upheld the restraint because it was limited to a specific
“neighbourhood” where only one bakery was likely to operate.194 When the
only question is who that operator would be, “the concern of the public is equal
189

See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13 (1984) (explaining that the patent example is “a special application of the cooperation-competition
balance” and that there is always “a tradeoff between optimal incentives ex ante and optimal use of existing knowledge”).
190
Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
191
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688–89 (1978).
192
Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 352.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 349.
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on both sides,”195 the court explained, and the “the restraint [wa]s exactly proportioned to the consideration, viz. the term of five years.”196
Market power was apparently irrelevant to the court’s decision. The
bakery unquestionably had the power to raise price profitably and surely
planned to use it. But the court never mentioned it. What mattered was that
business owners should have the ability to enter reasonably limited noncompete agreements to ensure adequate incentives to build successful businesses in the first place.197 In the terms used here, the ideal competitive
makeup of the baking industry permitted the defendant to foreclose competition for a period sufficient to enable the profitable sale of a business,
which in turn incentivized the development of new businesses that over
time would benefit consumers than short-run price rivalry would have.
b. Board of Trade of Chicago
The same pattern can be seen again and again in U.S. Supreme Court
decisions. In Board of Trade of Chicago, an early case interpreting the
Sherman Act, the government attacked the “call rule” that effectively
fixed the price for grain in transit to Chicago until the market re-opened at
the last price before the market close.198 In overturning a decision striking
down the rule, the Court explained that any harm caused by restricting
short-term price competition was outweighed by the longer-term benefits
from the cost-savings, information access, and market expansion provided
by the Board of Trade.199 As in Mitchel, the best competitive makeup of
the commodity trading industry did not include the sort of competition that
the Board restrained. As a result, the defendant was permitted to foreclose
competition in that realm.200
c. Addyston Pipe
In another seminal Sherman Act case, Addyston Pipe, the government
argued that a price-fixing agreement among firms selling more than half of
195

Id. at 352.
Id. Of course, if the market could really only support one bakery, there would have
been no need for the covenant not to compete.
197
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688–89 (1978); accord
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898).
198
Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 237 (1918).
199
Id. at 240–41 (explaining that these include expanded the market participants and
their knowledge of the market, enabling them to operate on smaller margins and thus
lower prices).
200
Id. at 241.
196
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the cast iron pipe in a certain geographic area violated the Sherman Act.201
Then-Judge Taft quoted Mitchel, explaining that “‘whether this is or not a
reasonable restraint of trade’” must turn on whether it merely “afford[ed] a
fair protection to the interests of the party in favor of whom it is given,” or
went further and “interfere[d] with the interests of the public.”202 That is,
whether the restraint was in a realm best governed by rivalry.
In contrast to the restraint in Mitchel—which was upheld because it
heightened the incentives to build successful businesses—the combination of
price-fixing and geographic concentration in Addyston Pipe tended to “discourage industry and enterprise, and diminish the products of ingenuity and
skill.”203 In such a case, there was little to balance against the harm resulting
from a lack of price competition.204 No specific fact enabled the court to
conclude this restraint had a deleterious effect on innovation.205 It certainly
did not rely exclusively on market share. Instead, it subjectively assessed the
industry to conclude that the form of competition restrained fell within a
realm that should be competitive and thus was part of the best competitive
makeup of the pipe industry.
d. Understanding the Early Cases
In Mitchel and Board of Trade of Chicago, the courts concluded that,
in the industries at issue, the best competitive makeup would not compel
competition among bakers immediately upon the sale of a bakery business
or among commodity agents (and their buyers) during hours when a commodity exchange market was closed.206 Although the defendants likely
had monopoly power, these forms of foreclosure and cooperation produced significant public benefits over the longer term that outweighed the
short-run benefit that rivalry would have produced. In Addyston Pipe, the
defendants likely had less power than the defendants in Mitchel and Board
of Trade of Chicago given that they did not possess a complete monopoly
and entry was likely easier. Nevertheless, the best competitive makeup of
that market required pipe manufacturers to compete on short-run prices.
Longer-run benefits of coordination were not wholly absent. For example,
201

Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 291–92.
Id. at 282 (quoting Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735, 131 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P. 1831));
id. at 282–83 (explaining that the law permits a restraint that is “necessary to the protection of either party”).
203
Id. at 280 (quoting Alger v. Thacher, 1837 WL 3220 (Mass. 1837)).
204
Id. at 302.
205
See id.
206
Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711); Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
202
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the potential for greater profit would draw competitive entry into the pipe
industry. The critical difference was that the longer-term consumer benefits from the pipe manufacturers’ restraint were unlikely to outweigh the
short-run loss of competition.
2. Dominant Firm Regulation
Section 2 of the Sherman Act207 governs the unilateral activity of dominant firms.208 Just as the early agreement cases discussed above employed
the competitive makeup approach rather than the paradigmatic dichotomy,
the dominant firm cases do so as well.
a. Alcoa
In 1945, Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in Alcoa articulated a theoretical basis for attacking concentrated economic power that would drive merger enforcement policy, in addition to dominant firm regulation, for two
decades.209 Importantly, he stressed that if one focused exclusively on “economic considerations,” then concentrated producing power, even if not
“used extortionately,” could raise serious antitrust concern.210
“[U]nchallenged economic power,” he explained may “deaden[] initiative,
discourage[] thrift and depress[] energy.”211 Where competition spurs innovation, a dominant position can be a “narcotic,” deadening the competitive
drive.212 “[T]he spur of constant stress is necessary,” he wrote, “to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.”213 Although economists recognized even a monopolist must be concerned about satisfying its
207

15 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2014).
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). Although
Alcoa was a lower court decision, the Supreme Court soon clarified that it constituted binding
nationwide precedent. Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811–12 (1946)
(explaining that Alcoa “was decided ... under unique circumstances which add to its weight as
a precedent.... That court sat in that case under a new statute authorizing it to render a decision
‘in lieu of a decision by the Supreme Court’ and providing that such decision ‘shall be final
and there shall be no review of such decision by appeal or certiorari or otherwise.’”).
209
Id.; see William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105,
1117–19 (1989) (discussing how Alcoa decision reinvigorated Sherman Act enforcement
and heavily influenced deconcentration policy until President Johnson’s antitrust policies
took the reins in 1969).
210
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 427.
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id.
208
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customers,214 Hand stressed “competitors, versed in the craft as no consumer can be, will be quick to detect opportunities for saving and new
shifts in production, and be eager to profit by them.”215 Despite his famous
references to market share,216 none of these conclusions flowed from
them. Hand subjectively assessed the value of competition in the aluminum industry, taking a page from the Austrian economists’ book.217
Hand has been accused of ascribing to an antiquated notion of antitrust
that saw big as, invariably, bad.218 But he was actually quite careful not to
fall into that trap. Although he certainly took market share into account, he
acknowledged “size does not determine guilt; … there must be some ‘exclusion’ of competitors; … growth must be something else than ‘natural’
or ‘normal’; that there must be a ‘wrongful intent,’ or some other specific
intent; or that some ‘unduly’ coercive means must be used.”219 As he famously put it, “[t]he successful competitor, having been urged to compete,
must not be turned upon when he wins.”220
Important for the purposes of this Article, Hand’s focus was decidedly
not on the ability of a firm to raise price profitably. The potential benefits
of competition, rather than the negative consequences of its absence drove
his analysis.221 This point is illustrated by his decision to exclude recycled
aluminum from the market.222 In counting only virgin aluminum, Hand
effectively decided the best competitive makeup of the aluminum industry
would stimulate the market for recycling longer term—rather than maximize
short-run price.223 No objective market fact dictated that decision. Hand
214

Id. at 426–27.
Id. The U.S. Supreme Court explicitly adopted this reasoning in Am. Tobacco Co.
v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 813–15 (1946).
216
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 427 (explaining that while a share “over ninety ... is enough to
constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be
enough; and certainly thirty-three per cent is not”).
217
See id.; infra Part IV.B.
218
Eugene V. Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive Instrument of Progress, 14
U. CHI. L. REV. 567, 577 (1947) (commenting that “[i]n the Aluminum case Judge Hand
finally interred and reversed the old dictum that size is not an offense under the Sherman
Act. Size, he concluded, was not only evidence of violation, or a potential offense, ... it
was the essence of the offense”).
219
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 429.
220
Id. at 430.
221
See id. at 427 (mentioning existence of social and moral benefits resulting from
having many competitors in an industry, rather than a few).
222
Id. at 425 (referring to recycled aluminum as “secondary”).
223
Id. Similarly, in discussing imported aluminum, Judge Hand made the judgment
that the antitrust market should be narrow enough to preclude Alcoa’s exploiting “the
limits afforded by the tariff and the cost of transportation.” Id. at 426.
215

452

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:413

used his ability to subjectively assess the value of competition in the
industry before him to determine the best competitive makeup of the
aluminum industry.
b. Grinnell and Griffith
By the 1960s, United States v. Grinnell Corp. established that section
2 case required a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant “willful[ly]
acqui[red] or maint[ained] ... [monopoly] power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident.”224 The use of a dominant position to gain a
competitive advantage, however, was suspect. In United States v. Griffith,225 for example, the Court explained that a firm with a dominant position in fire alarm systems in some geographic markets could not use that
position “to gain a competitive advantage”226 elsewhere even if “no competitors were driven out of business, or acquired by appellees, or impeded
in their business by threats or coercion ....”227 Again, the focus on competitive advantage embodied a subjective assessment about the value of
competition in a particular realm, rather than an objective calculation of
the defendant’s ability to properly raise price.228

The Second Circuit’s analysis of the price squeeze—the spread between Alcoa’s
wholesale and retail price—similarly constructed a competitive makeup in which Alcoa
had to enable meaningful retail competition. Id. at 436–38. That conclusion about the
aluminum industry differs from the Supreme Court’s recent assessment of a price squeeze
in the telecommunications market. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555
U.S. 438 (2009). But that difference is precisely the point—courts do not simply observe
market behavior; they construct appropriate competitive makeups for the industry in
question. The appropriate makeup of the unregulated aluminum industry in the 1940s
surely differed from the best makeup of the regulated telephony industry in the early
twenty-first century.
224
384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966).
225
334 U.S. 100 (1948).
226
Id. at 107.
227
Id. at 109.
228
Even Du Pont can be interpreted as divining the best competitive makeup of the
industry. Although it is generally interpreted as resolving the case at the first stage of a
dichotomous analytic by finding that Du Pont lacked market power, it may have actually
held that the best competitive makeup of the flexible wrapping industry does not require
competition within individual types of wrapping. Given that the government alleged that
Du Pont had monopolized the “cellophane market,” the Court may have ruled against the
government not because Du Pont lacked market power, but because there was no cellophane market to monopolize. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377 (1956).
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c. Modern Dominant Firm Doctrine
In the past decade, the Court has seemingly contradicted Alcoa’s approach,229 holding that even where statutory law compels cooperation,230
the antitrust laws do not.231 A monopolist telecommunications carrier is
thus free, as far as the antitrust laws are concerned, to gain a competitive
advantage from its dominant position by refusing to deal with competitors,
delaying a competitor’s entry,232 or charging a price for wholesale services
that is too high to permit viable retail competition.233
Alcoa’s monopolization standard has thus evolved, but not toward one that
focuses on the ability to raise price profitably as the singular threshold issue.
Rather, the Court has continued to search for an industry’s ideal competitive
makeup. Judge Hand was faced with determining the makeup for a midcentury, unregulated, relatively stable aluminum industry in which new entrants
faced significant barriers to entry. He concluded the best competitive makeup
of such an industry—the one that would best serve consumer interests—
required a successful enterprise to avoid a sustained dominant position by dealing with competitors on reasonable terms.234
For the modern Court, the best competitive makeup in the dynamic, twenty-first century, regulated telecommunications industry, not surprisingly, did
not include similar duties to foster short-run competition.235 Barriers to new
entry were lower and supported by specific statutory requirements designed to
229

Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 452 n.3 (2009) (signaling the Court’s change in view by responding to an argument based on Alcoa by
stating that “[g]iven developments in economic theory and antitrust jurisprudence since
Alcoa, we find our recent decisions ... more pertinent to the question before us”).
230
See generally Steven Semeraro, The Efficiency and Fairness of Enforced Sharing:
An Examination of the Essence of Antitrust, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 57 (2003) (analyzing the
Supreme Court’s refusal to find an antitrust violation when a monopolist violated a statutorily imposed duty to cooperate).
231
Pac. Bell, 555 U.S. at 448 n.2 (2009) (holding that duties imposed by telecommunications regulations do not impose antitrust duties).
232
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
415 (2004).
233
Pac. Bell, 555 U.S. at 450–51.
234
Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (noting Alcoa’s practices and dealings
with potential competitors prevented them from ever entering market).
235
The Court made quite clear that the regulated nature of the telecommunications industry was relevant to its decision. Verizon, 540 U.S. at 411–12 (“One factor of particular
importance is the existence of a regulatory structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm. Where such a structure exists, the additional benefit to competition
provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible that
the antitrust laws contemplate such additional scrutiny.”).

454

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:413

channel competition.236 In that context, the Court concluded, the tradeoff between short-run high prices and longer-run entry and innovation weighed in
favor of using rivalry to regulate the longer-run realm.237
Justice Scalia made this point quite explicitly for the Court in Verizon,
emphasizing that antitrust law’s longer-run goal is “[t]o safeguard the
incentive to innovate.”238 The ability to raise price profitably was a positive development for consumer welfare in this industry. Scalia explained:
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices is not only not unlawful, it is an important element of the free-market system. The opportunity to charge monopoly
prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’
in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and
economic growth.239

The Court determined that the best competitive makeup of the telecommunications industry did not require the short-run competition that the plaintiff
sought because longer-run competition better served consumer interests.240
d. Dominance Through Intellectual Property Rights
In many cases, intellectual property rights may convey a degree of
market power on an antitrust defendant. Like any dominant firm, an
intellectual property holder may use this power to form cooperative relationships through licensing, or it may attempt to foreclose competition
altogether by prohibiting competitors from using its property.241 Under
the antitrust dichotomy, when an intellectual property holder has market
power, increasing short-run prices would appear to violate the law. After
all, the defendant has power and is foreclosing competition and charging
prices above the competitive level.
236

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 required legacy local telephone providers to
deal with competitors in certain ways. 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2006).
237
See Pac. Bell Tel. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. at 452; Brooke Grp. Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225–27 (1993).
238
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004).
239
Id.; see Hovenkamp, supra note 80, at 2148 (“The inducement for creating [intellectual property] is the prospect of the ... returns” it generates.).
240
Verizon, 540 U.S. at 407–08.
241
See United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926) (permitting patentee to
license a patented technology that controlled the resale price of a patented article at a time
when resale price maintenance was treated as per se illegal); Easterbrook, supra note 16, at
13 (“[I]t is now understood that the grant of patent rights, though creating a restriction of
output during the patent’s life, is important to give people incentives to invent.”).
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The competitive makeup approach, however, explains why intellectual property holders may sometimes, but only sometimes, violate the
antitrust laws. Longer-run innovative competition is often more valuable
in intellectual property intensive industries, and when that is true, antitrust does not require rivalry with respect to either prices or short-run
quality improvements.
Some antitrust cases in the lower courts suggest that property rights
entirely exempt a defendant from antitrust scrutiny.242 The Supreme
Court, however, has repeatedly rejected that approach.243 To be sure,
industries in which intellectual property rights are important have different competitive makeups than industries without significant intellectual
property rights. But those differences do not immunize intellectual property holders from antitrust liability. Recognizing that creative entrepreneurs will discover ways to use their intellectual property to stifle rivalry
in realms where it would benefit consumers, the Court has imposed antitrust liability on intellectual property owners of every sort.244 The Court
also developed the concept of misuse245—including the first-sale rule,246
the patent fraud doctrine,247 and the prohibition of sham litigation248—to

242

See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012) (settlements generally “immune from antitrust attack”), rev’d and remanded by FTC v.
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544
F.3d 1323, 1333–36 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (similar), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2223 (2013); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 212–13 (2d Cir.
2006) (similar), abrogated by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
243
See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2232 (2013).
244
See id. (holding that settlement of a drug patent case may violate the antitrust laws
even if the patent is valid); United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 49–50 (1962)
(holding the same for a copyright holder); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 390–91 (1948) (holding that courts must “balance the privileges of [the patent holder] and its licensees under the patent grants with the prohibitions of the Sherman Act
against combinations and attempts to monopolize.”); United States v. Line Material Co.,
333 U.S. 287, 310 (1948) (holding that a cross licensing agreement that included resale
price maintenance of patented products set by agreement among the patent holders constituted “the improper use of [a patent] monopoly” violating the antitrust laws).
Similar considerations also drive whether a patent should even be available. See
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012).
245
See, e.g., Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 30 (1964) (holding that attempting to
charge licensing royalties beyond expiration of a patent constitutes misuse).
246
See, e.g., Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008)
(holding that patent may not be used to restrain competition after first sale).
247
Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174
248
Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49,
60–61 (1993) (adopting standards for showing when sham efforts to enforce a patent may
violate the antitrust laws).
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identify when a realm should be rivalrous despite a significant intellectual
property right.249
The functionality doctrine in trademark law further illustrates the
approach courts take in intellectual property cases.250 The doctrine prohibits a firm from using a functional aspect of its product as a trademark
because doing so would “inhibit[] legitimate competition by allowing a
producer to control a useful product feature.”251 In most situations,
competition to use a particular mark is not required because consumers
receive greater long-run benefits by relying on marks to identify the
source of products. For example, in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co.,252 the trademark owner was able to prevent a
competitor from using a mark embodying a feature of the product. The
Second Circuit held that the one-piece undulating feature of a bicycle
rack was not functional because other forms of bicycle racks could be
made that would compete with the trademark holder’s rack.253 This
conclusion was not self-evident. The court had to consider the nature of
249

Mayo, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (“The grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation more than it would tend to promote it … [and] too broad an interpretation of this
exclusionary principle could eviscerate patent law.”). The Court further explained that:
Patent protection is, after all, a two-edged sword. On the one hand, the
promise of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives that lead to
creation, invention, and discovery. On the other hand, that very exclusivity can impede the flow of information that might permit, indeed
spur, invention, by, for example, raising the price of using the patented
ideas once created, requiring potential users to conduct costly and timeconsuming searches of existing patents and pending patent applications,
and requiring the negotiation of complex licensing arrangements. At
the same time, patent law’s general rules must govern inventive activity
in many different fields of human endeavor, with the result that the
practical effects of rules that reflect a general effort to balance these
considerations may differ from one field to another.
Id. at 1305; see Semeraro, supra note 230, at 76–79 (reviewing case law requiring firms
to share property to facilitate competition).
250
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164–65 (1995).
251
Id.
252
Brandir Int’l Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148 (2d Cir.
1987); see also Topps Co. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., 96 Civ. 7302 (RWS), 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18556, at *22–26, *28–29 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1996) (holding that an infringer
cannot circumvent trade dress protection by asserting a defense of functionality on the
theory the prior user’s design constitutes a narrow product line, with which the infringer
can only compete by copying the prior user’s design elements); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Gay
Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 330, 334 (2d Cir. 1983) (defining product line as toy cars rather
than “Dukes of Hazzard” toy cars); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1045
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (defining product line as toy dolls rather than superhero dolls).
253
Brandir Int’l, 834 F.2d at 1148.
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competition in bicycle rack markets to determine that the industry’s best
competitive makeup favored longer-run competition to innovate new
types of bicycle racks over short-run price competition of those with
Brandir’s one-piece undulaters.
When a court concludes a mark contains a functional element, the
tradeoff flips in favor of short-run competition. For example, in Dippin’
Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution, the court held that a trademark on
the shape of frozen ice cream was functional.254 Of course, ice cream has
long been sold in a variety of other forms, and thus competition could
have continued even if the plaintiff were prohibited from using a particular shape. The court had to subjectively assess the industry’s competitive
makeup to conclude that in the ice cream industry short-run competition
with respect to a particular shape would best serve consumer interests.255
Again, the antitrust dichotomy cannot explain the results in these
cases. Firms with strong brands often have market power, and limiting
the use of their trademarks by competitors will harm consumers through
higher prices.256 The power-or-effect dichotomy has no ready means to
explain why trademark holders can exploit this market power only if
their marks do not include functional elements of their product.
The competitive makeup approach provides a workable system to decide these cases. By taking account of the relative value of short- and
longer-term consumer interests within a particular industry, a court determining the best competitive makeup can reasonably evaluate the value
of rivalry with respect to a trademarked element.257

254

Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distribution, LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1202 (11th
Cir. 2004).
255
Id. at 1206.
256
See generally Desai & Waller, supra note 143, at 1450–84 (discussing the relationship among brands, trademarks, and competition).
257
In line with the 2010 merger guidelines and Kaplow’s critique, Lemley and
McKenna argue that antitrust law needs to use evidence of anticompetitive effects, rather
than purely structural evidence, to determine market power. Lemley & McKenna, supra
note 66, at 2059. “The problems with market definition also mean that antitrust law must
pay more attention to actual competitive effects and less attention to nice numerical
formulas in evaluating mergers and anticompetitive conduct.” Id. at 2101. An enhanced
focus on effects, however, cannot bring coherence to the antitrust dichotomy because it
does not provide a means to determine if particular effects are justified. Lemley and
McKenna correctly recognized that courts need to determine “how much competition we
want in this space” and that “they might well make different policy judgments in different
circumstances.” Id. at 2102–03.
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3. Merger Cases258
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Supreme Court precluded mergers that increased concentration even when the merged firm’s share was not large
enough to suggest market power.259 In these cases, the Court did not focus
on the post-merger firm’s immediate ability to raise prices profitably. But
it did recognize that its task was more complicated than simply calculating
market shares. In Philadelphia National Bank, for example, Justice Brennan wrote that assessing the competitive impact of a merger required “a
workable compromise” that “delineat[ed]” the market in a “fair” way.260
There, the Court recognized that it could have legitimately viewed the
banking market in different ways.261 In these merger cases, the Court appears to have appreciated that it needed to determine the best competitive
makeup of the industry, rather than merely calculating market shares to
determine market power. Its process appears to have favored the long-run
goal of encouraging internal expansion rather than growth through merger.
The Court’s most recent substantive merger case, United States v.
General Dynamics,262 is often read as a change of course from its earlier
cases. Rather than block a merger despite relatively low market shares, the
Court permitted a merger despite relatively high shares.263 Again, however, the apparent change can also be explained by the Court’s following the
competitive makeup approach rather than the antitrust dichotomy.
In General Dynamics, the government presented evidence based on
historic sales of an increasingly concentrated coal market.264 Based on the
standard paradigm, the merger certainly appeared problematic given the
large market shares.265 But the trial court was not fooled, recognizing that
the competitive makeup of the coal industry did not support the government’s proposed market or the inference of market power from historic

258

Mergers are governed by § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (West 2014).
See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 281 (1964) (explaining that the acquired company “seems to us the prototype of the small independent
that Congress aimed to preserve”); United States v. Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365
n.42 (1963) (“[I]f concentration is already great, the importance of preventing even slight
increases in concentration and so preserving the possibility of eventual deconcentration is
correspondingly great.”).
260
Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 361.
261
Id. at 360–61.
262
United States v. Gen. Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
263
Id. at 503.
264
Id. at 494–96.
265
See id. at 496 (recognizing that the Court had blocked mergers based on the type of
statistical showing that the government offered).
259
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sales.266 In upholding the trial court, Justice Stewart explained the competitive makeup of industries such as beer and groceries—where the Court
had blocked mergers despite small shares—included an assumption that
historic market shares would likely persist.267 The coal industry had a
different competitive makeup because uncommitted reserves constituted a
better measure of future competitive significance.268
Since the 1970s, the Supreme Court has not played a significant role in
merger enforcement.269 But the leading lower court cases, including FTC v.
Staples270 and FTC v. Whole Foods Market,271 have turned on competitive
makeup rather than inferences of market power drawn from market shares.
In Staples, the court looked past the many sources of office supplies and the
small shares of individual providers, focusing on the meaningful competition that existed between office superstores.272 Although the Court
acknowledged “a broad market encompassing the sale of consumable office
supplies by all sellers of such supplies” and that all these sellers “at some
level, compete with one another,” it ultimately used market definition as a
tool to reveal a competitive makeup for the office supply industry that required superstores to compete.273
In Whole Foods, the lower court concluded that all grocery stores were
in the relevant market and, thus, the best competitive makeup did not require competing stores specializing in organic products.274 The appellate
court disagreed, not because the lower court drew the wrong inference
from the observable facts, but because the appellate court recognized a
possibility for beneficial competition in organic products.275 That is, the
best competitive makeup of the grocery industry would include a rivalrous
realm in the sale of organic products.

266

Id. at 491–94.
Id. at 501.
268
Id. at 501–02.
269
Thomas E. Kauper, Merger Control in the United States and The European Union:
Some Observations, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 305, 315 (2000) (explaining that “[t]he Supreme Court has not decided a merger case on the merits since 1974”).
270
FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.D.C. 1997).
271
FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
272
Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1080.
273
Id. at 1075.
274
Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1033 (citing district court opinion).
275
See id. at 1040–41 (recognizing that core customers would pay more for some organic products); id. at 1046–47 (Tatel, J., concurring) (following Staples holding evidence of
higher prices in markets where the merging parties did not compete suggests they are in
separate markets).
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In each case, the decision turned on an assessment about how competition should operate in the industry, not strictly on an observation of how it
did operate. To be sure, the courts relied on statistics about how certain
types of competition affected certain types of prices.276 But the decision
was not dictated by statistics. As the disagreement among the judges on
the appellate panel in Whole Foods demonstrated,277 the decision about
whether competition in a particular realm was required had to be constructed from a conception of the proper makeup of the market.
4. Modern Non-merger Horizontal Agreement Cases
Under section 1 of the Sherman Act,278 the competitive makeup approach again explains the case law more readily than the paradigmatic
dichotomy. The following sections review the per se doctrine, which imposes liability without proof of market power. It then compares and contrasts two pairs of similar rule-of-reason cases, and finally, it reviews the
Court’s most recent rule-of-reason case, which renewed the long-standing
position that intellectual property rights do not insulate an agreement from
antitrust scrutiny.
a. Per Se Cases
The per se doctrine provides the clearest example of the use of the
competitive makeup approach.279 It holds that naked horizontal agreements that restrain trade are illegal without requiring the plaintiff to prove
that the defendant had market power or that consumers were harmed.280
Per se illegal practices are often said to include price-fixing, market division, bid rigging, customer allocation, and certain group boycotts.281 In
276

Id. at 1040; Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1075–78.
Whole Foods, 548 F.3d at 1041, 1051 (writing separately, each judge voiced their opinion; Judge Brown’s lead opinion was not joined by Judge Tatel’s concurrence in the judgment).
278
15 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 2014).
279
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (“[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse
for their use.”).
280
Id.
281
See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50 (1990) (per curiam) (holding
agreement not to compete, including an agreement to allocate territory per se illegal); FTC v.
Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 435–36 (1990) (group boycott); Arizona v.
Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (agreement to set maximum price);
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 648–50 (1980) (per curiam) (agreement not
277
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actual practice, however, the Supreme Court has not imposed bright-line
rules.282 Instead, courts decide whether a per se rule applies by determining the best competitive makeup of the industry.283
The competitive makeup inquiry in per se cases is implemented
through what the courts have called the naked agreement requirement.284
A business practice that would be per se illegal may not be if it is an integrated part of a potentially pro-competitive agreement.285 For example, a
group boycott is per se illegal if it functions solely to restrain immediate
price competition in a market where innovation is not important.286 In
contrast, a boycott may be lawful when used to enforce rules governing a
pro-competitive group purchasing agreement.287 Even agreements fixing
price may be permissible when sufficiently integrated into a procompetitive scheme.288
These decisions about whether an agreement is naked or integrated are
inquiries into the competitive makeup of the industry. Some integration is
not enough, and no universal rule draws a bright line.289 Rather, the per se
cases are best understood to condemn an agreement when a court determines that competition in a particular industry should govern the realm in
to compete on credit terms); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972)
(agreement to divide territories); Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207,
211–13 (1959) (group boycott); Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395–96
(1947) (tying); Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466–67
(1941) (group boycott); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223
(1940) (agreement to stabilize price); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271
(6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (territorial division).
282
See Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1979) (holding that even though
Broadcast Music engaged in literal price-fixing as defined by the Sherman Act, this did
not mean they were “per se in violation of the Sherman Act”).
283
See supra notes 281–82.
284
BMI, 441 U.S. at 20 (explaining that the agreement before the Court was “not a
‘naked restrain[t] of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition,’ ... but rather
[it] accompanie[d] the integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement”); compare
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5–7 (2006) (refusing to apply per se rule to an integrated joint venture agreement that included a jointly set price term), with White Motor
Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (explaining that per se rule applies to
“naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition ...”).
285
See Texaco, 547 U.S. at 5–6.
286
See Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 433–34; Klor’s, 359 U.S. at 212.
287
See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 296 (1985).
288
See BMI, 441 U.S. at 20.
289
Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 342, 348 (1982) (applying
the per se rule even though an agreement to set maximum prices was part of an integrated
agreement to provide insurance coverage).
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which the agreement restrained rivalry. By concluding that an agreement
is sufficiently integrated, however, the court effectively finds the competitive makeup of the industry is such that competition should not govern the
realm in which the agreement restrained rivalry.290
In both BMI and Catalano, the parties made plausible arguments that
their agreements were integrated.291 In the former, the Court concurred
because blanket song-copyright licenses significantly reduced the transaction costs that individual negotiation and monitoring would entail.292 By
contrast, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s finding that an agreement
prohibiting the sale of beer on credit was part of an integrated scheme to (1)
open the distribution market to new competitors and (2) spur competition by
increasing pricing visibility.293 No objective standard of integration dictated
these results. Rather, the Court determined that the best competitive makeup
of the beer delivery industry required immediate competition on credit
terms while the best competitive makeup of song-copyright licensing did
not necessarily compel individual copyright owners to compete on price.294
b. Professional Engineers and California Dental Association
In 1978’s National Society of Professional Engineers, the Antitrust Division challenged a rule prohibiting engineers from including a price in their
initial project proposal.295 In 1999’s California Dental Association, the FTC
challenged a rule prohibiting dentists from including discounting information in advertisements.296 In both cases, the organizations sought to justify their rules on ethical grounds,297 and both associations had market power.
The Court struck down the engineers’ rule but not the dentists’.298
The difference in the outcomes can be explained by the contrasting competitive makeups of the two industries. In bidding markets with sophisticated
buyers, as with most engineering projects, if firms include prices in their
290

See Texaco, 547 U.S. at 5–6, (refusing to apply the per se rule to integrated agreement). In rejecting the per se rule, a court would not be holding definitively that the best
competitive makeup of the industry has been achieved. It would signal only that further
analysis would be required. BMI, 441 U.S. at 24–25 (rejecting application of the per se
rule but remanding with instructions to consider the practice under the rule of reason).
291
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 645 (1980) (per curiam); BMI,
441 U.S. at 7.
292
BMI, 441 U.S. at 20–21.
293
Catalano, 446 U.S. at 645–46.
294
Id. at 643–44; BMI, 441 U.S. at 20–22.
295
Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 681(1978).
296
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 762 (1999).
297
Id. at 760–61; Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 681.
298
Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 781; Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 694–96.
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bids, the ensuing competition would stimulate more efficient engineering.299
The engineers countered that the tradeoff for short-run price competition
would be a longer-run trend toward unethical bidding and compromises on
safety and quality.300
In favoring short-run price competition in the engineering industry, the
Court did not discuss the defendant’s market power.301 Instead, it contrasted
the facts before it with those of Mitchel v. Reynolds.302 In that case, Justice
Stevens explained, the English court had held that “[t]he long-run benefit of
enhancing the marketability of the business itself—and thereby providing
incentives to develop such an enterprise—outweighed the temporary and
limited loss of competition.”303 No similar long-run competitive concern in
the engineering market outweighed the benefit of short-run competition.304
As a result, the best competitive makeup of the engineering industry included price competition in engineers’ initial bids.305
In California Dental, by contrast, the Court recognized that retail dental
markets are “characterized by striking disparities between the information
available to the professional and the patient,” a mass market of unsophisticated customers.306 Even competitors, Justice Souter recognized, faced
“significant challenges to informed decisionmaking.”307 In overturning the
lower court’s use of a truncated rule-of-reason analysis,308 the majority
focused on the tradeoff between short-run price competition that discount
advertising would generate and longer-run competition made possible by
preserving a market in which relatively uninformed customers had accurate
information.309 On remand, the lower court chose a competitive makeup
that permitted advertising restraints to ensure more accurate information.310
299

Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 695 (“The assumption that competition is the best method
of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain-quality,
service, safety, and durability-and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the
free opportunity to select among alternative offers.”).
300
Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 693–94.
301
See id.
302
See supra Part IV.F.1.a; Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 688–89.
303
Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. at 689.
304
Id. at 696.
305
Id.
306
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771 (1999).
307
Id. at 773.
308
Id. at 763–65.
309
See id. at 774–75 (“[E]ven if across-the-board discount advertisements were more
effective in drawing customers in the short run, the recurrence of some measure of intentional or accidental misstatement due to the breadth of their claims might leak out over
time to make potential patients skeptical of any such across-the-board advertising, so
undercutting the method’s effectiveness.”).
310
Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 224 F.3d 942, 957 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Justice Souter’s opinion in California Dental went further than Professional Engineers in highlighting the subjective component of antitrust
analysis. First, he explained that in the Supreme Court cases in which
antitrust liability had been upheld, “an observer with even a rudimentary
understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”311
As Justice Souter emphasized, reaching that conclusion required courts to
consult “theory”312 and consider the impact of a restraint within a particular industry.313 Merely observing market facts was not enough.
Second, although the available facts about how the market operates are
relevant, identifying the industry’s best competitive makeup is the judge’s
ultimate task.314 Without mentioning market power,315 Justice Souter’s
majority opinion explained that “there must be some indication that the
court making the decision has properly identified the theoretical basis for
the anticompetitive effects and considered whether the effects actually
are anticompetitive.”316 He also “emphasized the necessity, particularly
great in the quasi-common law realm of antitrust, that courts explain the
logic of their conclusions,”317 where mechanically applying a formula
would not suffice. “[T]here is generally no categorical line to be drawn,”
he explained, between types of restraints.318 “What is required ... is an
enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and logic
of a restraint. The object is to … [make] a confident conclusion about the
principal tendency of a restriction ….”319
c. NCAA and BMI
In the NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma320 football case and the Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS321 copyright case, the
311

Cal. Dental, 526 U.S at 770.
See id. at 771.
313
See id. at 773 (emphasizing that an anticompetitive practice in one industry “could
have different effects from those ‘normally’ found in the commercial world” in another
industry, perhaps even pro-competitive effects).
314
See id. at 779 (holding that the “Court of Appeals’s [sic] conclusion at least required a more extended examination of the possible factual underpinnings”).
315
Even the dissent only “assume[d]” that market power would be a relevant issue. Id.
at 788 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
316
Id. at 775 n.12 (emphasis added).
317
Id. at 780.
318
Id.
319
Id. at 781.
320
468 U.S. 85 (1984).
321
441 U.S. 1 (1979).
312
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Court dealt with licensing arrangements between the defendants and
television networks. The Court in NCAA held that universities had to
engage in short-run price competition to license college football telecasts.322 In BMI, however, the Court found reasons to favor a different
competitive makeup in the music copyright licensing industry. The benefits of coordination in licensing thousands of available songs—such as
one-stop shopping and centralized monitoring—created long-run competitive benefits that outweigh the short-run benefits that would flow
from copyright-to-copyright price competition.323 No similar long-run
benefit applied to the televising of college football games, and thus the
Court determined that the competitive makeup of the college football
television market required short-run competition.324
d. Actavis
In its most recent antitrust case, FTC v. Actavis, Inc.,325 the Court held
that a patent holder could violate the antitrust laws by paying an alleged
infringer to withhold its product from the market until the patent expired.326 Lower courts had held that as long as the agreement limited competition during the life of the patent, the settlement would fall within the
patent’s scope and could not violate the antitrust laws.327 The Court rejected that reasoning.328 A court must, Justice Breyer wrote for the majority,
“seek to accommodate patent and antitrust policies.”329 This process involves more than the search for market power and competitive effects.
After all, the patent holder obviously had market power and the agreement
ensured that consumers would pay much more for the drug than they
would have in a competitive market. Under the antitrust dichotomy, the
defendant’s payment would always violate the antitrust laws.
The Court might have recognized a bright-line exception for patent
holders, but it did not. Trial courts, the Actavis majority explained, must
consider all aspects bearing on the anticompetitive effect of a business

322

NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113.
BMI, 441 U.S. at 20–21. The Court has also held dentists and doctors had to engage in short-run competition with respect to their dealings with health insurance companies. See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 341–42, 348–49, 351–54
(1982); FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457–65 (1986).
324
NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113.
325
133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
326
Id. at 2227.
327
Id. at 2230.
328
See id. at 2227.
329
Id. at 2233.
323
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practice to determine whether a patent holder violated the antitrust laws.330
Courts must vary the depth of their inquiry “with the circumstances” and
“avoid, on the one hand, the use of antitrust theories too abbreviated to
permit proper analysis, and, on the other, consideration of every possible
fact or theory irrespective of the minimal light it may shed on the basic
question—that of the presence of significant unjustified anticompetitive
consequences.”331 In other words, the court must determine the best competitive makeup of the industry in order to assess whether the defendant
restrained rivalry in a realm efficiently governed by competition.332
V. RESPONDING TO THE LIKELY CRITIQUE
Critics of the competitive makeup approach will likely contend that
Part IV reads too much into Supreme Court dicta and places too little
weight on lower court cases that time and again dismiss antitrust claims
based solely—so they say—on the defendants’ lack of market power.333 In
per se cases, the critic will likely argue that the Court simply presumes
that market power exists. The intellectual property cases are exceptions in
which market power is tolerated, and in the dominant firm, merger, and
rule-of-reason and agreement cases, the Court was either (1) discussing
market power without saying so explicitly or (2) discussing effects in
cases where market power was obvious.
This Part distinguishes the antitrust dichotomy and the competitive
makeup approaches and then shows that courts do not apply the dichotomy even when they say that they are.
A. Distinguishing the Antitrust Dichotomy from the Competitive Makeup
Approach
How one views antitrust analysis depends on how one frames the concept
of market power. Everyone knows the market share needed to establish power
under the standard dichotomy varies by industry and depends on entry barriers, excess capacity, and other factors.334 Similarly, the competitive makeup
takes account of a defendant’s ability to impact the market in determining
330

See id. at 2238.
Id.
332
Id. at 2237 (stressing that “[t]he existence and degree of any anticompetitive consequence may also vary ... among industries”).
333
See, e.g., Bathke v. Casey’s Gen. Stores, Inc., 64 F.3d 340, 345 (8th Cir. 1995)
(“Antitrust claims often rise or fall on the definition of the relevant market.”).
334
See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (holding that a location restriction should be analyzed under the rule of reason); United States
v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that low barriers to entry
rendered the resulting high market share of a merger inapposite).
331
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which realms should be governed competitively. No one would dispute that
rivalry is not always required and that the value of competition varies across
industries and time.335
The real point of disagreement is whether market power is capable of
playing the gatekeeper role Easterbrook envisioned for it.336 If all a critic
of the competitive makeup approach means by a “market power threshold
inquiry” is that courts impose antitrust liability only when the defendants
are capable of harming consumers, then there is no real disagreement.337 It
is always possible at the end of the analysis to conclude that if rivalry
should prevail in a particular market realm, then the defendants’ conduct is
not innocuous.
Concluding post-hoc that the defendant may cause harm, however, is
not what the antitrust dichotomy holds. As crystallized by Landes, Posner,
and Easterbrook (and as accepted by virtually all modern antitrust commentators), the dichotomy maintains that a court can meaningfully determine
whether a defendant has the ability to harm consumers without examining
what the defendant has actually done or theorizing about what it might
do.338 Indeed, the main point of the market power threshold, according to
Easterbrook, was to free courts from the need to assess conduct and effect
by allowing them to focus exclusively on market structure.339
This Article contends that market power cannot meaningfully play this
role. To assess a potential threat to consumer interests, a court must determine
whether competition should govern the realm in which the defendant is accused of acting anti-competitively, and that decision will invariably involve a
tradeoff between short-run and longer-term consumer benefits. Sometimes
market power will be important, but not always. It simply cannot play a
threshold role. Apparently recognizing this reality, courts analyze antitrust
cases using the competitive makeup approach both because the Supreme
Court has told them to and because it is the only logical way to do it.340

335

E.g., Polk Bros. v. Forest City, Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Antitrust
law is designed to ensure an appropriate blend of cooperation and competition, not to
require all economic actors to compete full tilt at every moment.”); United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898) (“Contracts for the partial
restraint of trade are upheld, not because they are advantageous to the individual with
whom the contract is made, ... but because it is for the benefit of the public at large that
they should be enforced.”).
336
See Easterbrook, supra note 16.
337
See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 2, 5–11.
338
See Landes & Posner, supra note 27; Easterbrook, supra note 16.
339
Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 39.
340
See supra Part I.
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B. Revealing Competitive Impact Analysis Within a Rhetoric of Dichotomy
Courts recite the rhetoric of dichotomy.341 When a judge imposes antitrust liability, the defendants will typically have large market shares, but
when a court holds that the defendants did not violate the law, their shares
will often be small. Courts understandably rely on these small shares to
dismiss the case and truncate appellate review without articulating why
competition was not required in the realm in which the defendant’s conduct was attacked. Whether the court really relied on a market power
threshold or determined the best competitive makeup of the industry, but
failed to articulate its reasoning, is impossible to determine. Indeed, given
the obviousness of the result, the presiding judge may not have thought all
that deeply about it.
To gain insight into the analytical framework courts actually apply,
one needs to examine the difficult cases: (1) those in which signs of market power exist, yet the court does not impose liability and, (2) those cases
where power appears to be lacking, yet the courts impose it. To be sure,
courts typically recite the rhetoric of dichotomy in these cases as well.342
A closer read, however, reveals their focus is on competitive makeup.343
1. Market Power in Per Se Cases
In per se cases, courts impose liability without market power, clearly
relying on a competitive makeup analysis.344 When the agreement is naked, the value of short-run competition predominates and, thus rivalry
must govern that realm.345 Integrated agreements, however, have longerrun benefits that may outweigh the value of short-run rivalry.346 Cases
involving integrated agreements are thus inappropriate for per se treatment

341

Id.
See, e.g., supra Part I.
343
Infra Part V.B.1–2.
344
See Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348, 350–54 (1982);
FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 428–36 (1990). Cf. Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9–18 (1984).
345
See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (1898); United
States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (“It is only after considerable
experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act.”)
346
See, e.g., Bus. Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 735 (1988)
(“[E]conomic analysis supports the view, and no precedent opposes it, that a vertical
restraint is not illegal per se unless it includes some agreement on price or price levels.”).
342
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because the court must carefully balance the short- and longer-run benefits to determine the value of rivalry in each realm.
Within the antitrust dichotomy, per se cases can only be explained as a
curious exception in which harm supposedly occurs even though the market power threshold is never crossed. The critic would presumably explain
the per se rule as an administrative cost-saving device that courts use in
cases where the defendant’s power is obvious.347 Easterbrook, however,
did not believe that market power would be present in all per se cases. He
thus urged courts to apply the market power screen to them.348 Also,
scholars have recognized that in certain circumstances price fixing and
other per se conduct can benefit consumers.349
Even if market power was always present, the dichotomy could not
explain why the identified pro-consumer benefits should be ignored in per
se cases. Moreover, if the defendant’s possession of market power in these
cases were obvious, the administrative costs of applying the rule of reason
would be small, undermining the supposed administrative benefit.350 This
is particularly true given that per se cases can be quite complex when
defendants plausibly assert that their agreement was integrated in a way
that benefitted consumers.351
347

ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 269 (1978) (explaining that if defendants in per se cases “were allowed to prove lack of market power,” they could “introduc[e] … the enormous complexities of market definition into every price-fixing case”);
see Donald L. Beschle, ‘What, Never? Well, Hardly Ever’: Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as an
Alternative to Per Se Antitrust Illegality, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 475 (1987) (“Judicial
administration, it is argued, is much simpler under a per se rule, and businessmen may
plan their activity with much greater certainty.”).
348
Easterbrook, supra note 16, at 16–17, 39.
349
Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and
the Challenge of Intramarket Second–Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849, 924 (2000).
350
Beschle, supra note 347, at 475–76 (“Arguing that types of activity can be identified as invariably anticompetitive is futile; counterexamples can almost always be put
forward. Consequently, defenders of per se categorization are reduced to one of two
unattractive alternatives. First, they can concede that per se categories may in some
instances prohibit procompetitive activity, but argue that the overall benefits of per se
categorization justify the result. Such an argument is unsatisfying because it explicitly
sacrifices particular blameless defendants in order to search for an increase in general
welfare. Second, per se defenders can narrow their categories to eliminate procompetitive
counterexamples. This strategy, however, threatens to destroy those categories entirely.
And if most of the once-condemned activity is returned to the realm of the rule of reason,
the insight that certain types of behavior are particularly dangerous is lost.”).
351
See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348, 337–38
(1982) (explaining that each of the three judges on the appellate panel drew a different conclusion as to whether the per se rule should apply and the U.S. Supreme Court
split 6–3).
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In any event, the Supreme Court has squarely rejected the notion that
the per se rule condemns restraints based on a presumption of market
power.352 In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association,353 the D.C.
Circuit applied the rule of reason to an agreement among criminal defense
attorneys not to take appointments unless the city increased its fees.354
Although naked boycotts of this type had been held illegal per se,355 the
lower court believed that because this one involved petitioning the government, the FTC was required “[to] prove, and not merely presume, that
the boycotters ha[d] market power.”356
In overturning the D.C. Circuit’s decision and applying the per se rule,
the Supreme Court rejected the notion “that the categorical prohibitions
against price fixing and boycotts are merely rules of ‘administrative convenience’ that do not serve any substantial governmental interest unless
the price-fixing competitors actually possess market power.”357 The Court
held that restraints are illegal per se because they “pose[] some threat to
the free market” and may “inflict real injury upon particular consumers or
competitors” despite the defendants’ lack of market power.358 Liability is
thus imposed without a market power threshold because the defendants
restrained competition in a realm best governed by short-run rivalry.
2. Market Power in Non-Per Se Cases
The following cases illustrate the courts’ use of the competitive
makeup approach in a variety of situations in which the courts recited the
rhetoric of dichotomy.
352

To be sure, the Court has held that “[t]he rationale for per se rules in part is to
avoid a burdensome inquiry into actual market conditions in situations where the likelihood of anticompetitive conduct is so great as to render unjustified the costs of determining whether the particular case at bar involves anticompetitive conduct.” Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15–16, 15 n.25 (1984). In a later case, however,
the Court noted the import of the phrase “in part,” stressing the rule has a substantive
component. FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 432 n.15 (1990).
353
Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
354
Id. at 428–36.
355
See Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
356
Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 429 (citing FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial
Lawyers Ass’n, 856 F.2d 226, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
357
Id. at 430, 432 n.15.
358
Id. at 434–35; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224–26 n.59
(1940) (“[T]he fact that the group [fixing prices] cannot control the market prices does not
necessarily mean that the agreement ... has no utility to the members of the combination.
The effectiveness of price-fixing agreements is dependent on many factors, such as competitive tactics, position in the industry, the formula underlying pricing policies.”).
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a. Kodak Copier Case
This case counters the critic’s argument that the Court must have concluded market power exists whenever it recognizes potential liability. An
independent service organization sued Kodak, alleging that the copier manufacturer (1) unlawfully tied the purchase of spare parts for its copiers to the
labor required for the repair and (2) attempted to monopolize the provision
of service for its machines.359 The plaintiff did not dispute Kodak’s lack of
power in the copier market,360 but argued that Kodak had power in the
parts market.361 Kodak responded that even if it were the sole producer of
parts for its own copiers, it could not raise the price profitably362 because
competitors in the copier market would exploit Kodak’s high prices on
parts and service to win copier sales.363 Any extra profit Kodak might earn
on the service side would be lost on the copier side.364
The trial court agreed, granting summary judgment after “truncated
discovery,”365 but the Supreme Court saw the case differently.366 The
holding had little to do with Kodak’s share of any market, barriers to entry, excess supply, or any other structural factor typically associated with
the first stage of the antitrust dichotomy.367 Rather, the Court relied on two
theories about the appropriate role of competition in the copier industry,
holding that the plaintiff had a right to discovery into whether rivalry
would best govern the realm of parts and service.368
Writing for the Court, Justice Blackmun cited the possibility that
consumers would be harmed because they may (1) not have known the
full extent of copier service costs when they bought the machine, and (2)
have been locked into paying supra-competitive parts and service prices
because doing so was more economical than purchasing a new copier.369
In addition, the Court reasoned that while innovative marketing strategies—such as a low upfront price with additional payments depending
on the customer’s need for service—can be pro-competitive, one that

359

Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 459 (1992).
Id. at 466 n.10.
361
Id. at 464.
362
Id. at 465–66.
363
Id. at 474 n.21.
364
Id. at 465–67.
365
Id. at 456.
366
Id. at 453.
367
Id. at 451.
368
See id. at 503–04.
369
Id. at 472–77.
360

472

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 5:413

involved limiting customer choice on parts and service in the copier
industry might not be.370
This analysis is a competitive makeup assessment. The Court instructed
the district court to go beyond the structural arguments typically associated
with market power and determine whether the best competitive makeup in
the copier industry would include competition in the aftermarket for parts
and service.371 Although the Court recited the paradigmatic rhetoric,372
using the term market power in the context of a theoretical assessment of
the value of rivalry in particular realms strips the concept of its traditional
meaning. Market power cannot block the court from considering how competition operates in an industry, as Easterbrook envisioned it would, if a
court can only understand whether the defendant has power by determining
whether competition in a particular realm best serves consumer interests, as
the Supreme Court required the lower court to do in Kodak.373
Both the Department of Justice’s amicus brief374 and a dissenting opinion joined by three Justices made this point.375 The Court, they explained,
had essentially held that “every maker of unique parts for its own product
... [has] market power no matter how unimportant its product might be in
the market.”376 Concluding that a firm concededly lacking “power” in its
product’s market, somehow has “power” in a sub-market for spare
parts,377 is to recognize, in Justice Scalia’s words, “a curious form of market power”378 that extends the concept beyond where the “reasoning ...
[justifying it] leaves off.”379
370

Id. at 478–79.
Id. at 470 (“Even if Kodak could not raise the price of service and parts one cent without losing equipment sales, that fact would not disprove market power in the aftermarkets.”).
372
Id. at 477 (holding that “Kodak has failed to demonstrate that respondents’ inference of market power in the service and parts markets is unreasonable”).
373
See id. at 467–70.
374
Id. at 470 n.16 (quoting the government’s argument in its amicus brief, “[t]he
ISOs’ claims are implausible because Kodak lacks market power in the markets for its
copier and micrographic equipment. Buyers of such equipment regard an increase in the
price of parts or service as an increase in the price of the equipment, and sellers recognize
that the revenues from sales of parts and service are attributable to sales of the equipment.
In such circumstances, it is not apparent how an equipment manufacturer such as Kodak
could exercise power in the aftermarkets for parts and service”).
375
Id. at 487–91 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
376
Id. at 493.
377
Id. at 489.
378
Id. at 493.
379
Id. at 489. Critics may claim Kodak has been undermined by the Court’s more
recent decision in Verizon. There, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority that “the possession of monopoly power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an
371
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Whether the Court’s Kodak decision was correct or not, it followed a
competitive makeup approach rather than the paradigmatic dichotomy.
b. Rothery Storage
In Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., the plaintiffs
alleged that Atlas Van Lines, a moving company, and its network of small
movers agreed to exclude from the network any mover that competed with
Atlas.380 In a famous opinion for a D.C. Circuit panel, Judge Bork began
by concluding “the rule of reason [could not have been] offended since
Atlas’ market share is far too small for the restraint to threaten competition.”381 At that point, the case looked to be a straightforward application
of the paradigm, dismissed at stage one of the dichotomy because the
defendant lacked market power.
Judge Bork, however, revealed the dichotomy’s falsity by what he wrote
next. Embedded within the court’s initial conclusion that Atlas was too small
to do harm, he recognized, was an implicit assumption about the realms of the
moving industry that should be governed by competition.382 He acknowledged what courts often leave unstated—that the best competitive makeup of
the moving industry permitted networks to foreclose short-run competition
from their members.383 Outside competition by affiliated carriers was not part
of the best competitive makeup, Judge Bork explained, because “restraints
[on outside competition could] only be intended to enhance efficiency”384 and
element of anticompetitive conduct.” Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis
V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). That language appears to signal a two-stage
inquiry into power and then conduct. A closer look at the case, however, reveals something more is going on. The defendant in Verizon engaged in many acts that hindered
the ability of competitors to compete in the short run and likely increased consumer
prices. Id. at 404–05 (recognizing that respondent alleged that Verizon “filled rivals’
orders on a discriminatory basis as part of an anticompetitive scheme to discourage
customers from becoming or remaining customers of competitive LECs, thus impeding
the competitive LECs’ ability to enter and compete in the market for local telephone
service”). Nothing in the standard dichotomy explains why those practices should have
been permitted. To conclude that the challenged conduct was not “anticompetitive,” the
Court had to determine the best competitive makeup of the telecom industry did not
require rivalry in the realms that the defendant foreclosed.
380
792 F.2d 210, 213 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
381
Id. at 214. “Analysis might begin and end with the observation that Atlas and its
agents command between 5.1 and 6% of the relevant market, which is the interstate
carriage of used household goods.” Id. at 217.
382
Id. at 214.
383
See id. at 223–27.
384
Id. at 229 n.11.
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could not “have been intended to” harm consumers.385 By ultimately conflating the inquiry into consumer harm with the court’s market power analysis,
Judge Bork effectively recognized that the two are part of a unitary competitive makeup inquiry.386
c. Staples–Office Depot Merger
In FTC v. Staples, Inc.,387 the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia followed a similar path, enjoining the merger between Staples
and Office Depot.388 It shoehorned the case into the paradigmatic rubric by
defining the market as “office supply superstores,” a market in which the
court could infer the merged firm would have power based on its large
share.389 As in Kodak, however, this was a curious form of market power.
The court recognized that lots of stores sold office supplies and were easily accessible to businesses large and small.390 And like Judge Bork, the
court did not simply rely on its structural market analysis. It explained
quite carefully how anticompetitive effects would flow from the merger
despite the apparently competitive options.391
Once again, the court’s analysis fits more comfortably within the
framework of determining the best competitive makeup. In the office
supply industry, the court held, short-run rivalry should govern the realm
that included office superstores.392 To force that conclusion into the paradigmatic dichotomy is either (1) to deny the reasoning process through
which the court actually decided to block the merger, or (2) to strip the
market power concept of the attributes that it needs to play the threshold
role that the antitrust dichotomy requires it to play.

385

Id. at 214.
Id. at 230 n.11 (stating that “[a]ntitrust adjudication has always proceeded through
inferences about market power drawn from market shares” without citing a single Supreme Court case in support).
387
970 F. Supp. 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
388
See infra notes 393–96 and accompanying text. See generally Staples, 970 F.
Supp. 1066.
389
Staples, 970 F. Supp. at 1074–82 (defining the relevant product market as office
superstores).
390
Id. at 1078.
391
Id. at 1081–86, 1082 nn.13, 14 (determining that the merger would have anticompetitive effect).
392
See id. at 1083–86.
386
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d. Lundbeck
A drug company, Lundbeck, Inc., acquired the only two drug treatments for a potentially life-threatening heart condition afflicting premature
infants.393 First, it acquired Indocin IV, the only drug treatment then on the
market and immediately increased the price by 40 percent.394 Shortly
thereafter, it acquired another drug, NeoProfen,395 that upon Food & Drug
Administration (FDA) approval would become the second available treatment.396 Within days of the second acquisition, the drug company increased Indocin IV’s price 1,278 percent.397 Four months later, the FDA,
as expected, approved NeoProfen,398 and the drug company priced it just a
few dollars below Indocin.399
The FTC sued, alleging that the defendant violated the antitrust laws
by acquiring the second drug.400 The structural evidence of market power
was overwhelming. The defendant owned the only two drug treatments,
both of which were effective 75–90 percent of the time.401 The FDA explicitly rejected labeling that would have allowed NeoProfen to claim
superiority to Indocin, thus recognizing the two were interchangeable.402
Also, if there were any doubt, the defendant’s internal documents confirmed the drugs were substitutes.403 Lundbeck purchased NeoProfen so it
393

FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 1238 (8th Cir. 2011); FTC v. Lundbeck,
Inc., Civil Nos. 08–6379 (JNE/JJG), 08–6381 (JNE/JJG), 2010 WL 3810015, at *4–5 (D.
Minn. Aug. 31, 2010).
394
Lundbeck, 2010 WL 3810015, at *6.
395
Id. at *5.
396
This transaction was too small to require mandatory reporting to the antitrust enforcement agencies. Minnesota v. Ovation Pharms., Inc., 2008 WL 5347144 ¶ 22 (D.
Minn.) (Complaint) (“The size of the NeoProfen transaction fell below the regulatory
threshold for reporting acquisitions to the federal antitrust agencies.”).
397
Lundbeck, 2010 WL 3810015, at *8.
398
Id. at *2–3.
399
Id. at *8–9.
400
Id. at *1; Complaint ¶¶ 6–7, Minnesota v. Ovation Pharms., Inc., No. 08CV06379,
2008 WL 5347143 (D. Minn. Dec. 16, 2008) (No. 08-06381).
401
FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., Civil Nos. 08–6379 (JNE/JJG), 08–6381 (JNE/JJG), 2010
WL 3810015, at *4 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010).
402
Id. at *3.
403
Lundbeck, 2010 WL 3810015, at *10–11 (finding the defendant’s internal documents showed that the company believed that “NeoProfen will capture a significant
portion of the pharmaceutical PDA market at the expense of Indocin IV” and “base case
Indocin IV forecast assumed volume and sales loss due to new competition (generic entry
and NeoProfen). Based on NeoProfen diligence completed to date and associated analysis, we have confirmed our deal model sales projections and the expected sales loss.”)
(emphasis added).
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could “cannibalize [its] Indocin IV sales in a controlled manner” and “realize a more stable revenue stream for both products.”404 Finally, the defendant trained its sales staff to convince hospitals to switch from Indocin,
which was about to face generic competition, to NeoProfen, which had
continued patent protection.405 To assist its sales staff in this effort, the
defendant set NeoProfen’s price at a percentage discount below Indocin
IV to, internal documents stated, take “away potential pharmacoeconomic
debate” and allow sales representatives to focus on product differentiation
without “spending time with the pharmacy director on price.”406
A trial court implementing the standard antitrust dichotomy would see
an easy decision: the relevant market consisted of drugs treating heart
defects in premature infants, and the defendant had market power because
it owned the only two. As if that were not enough, the defendant had increased the price more than ten-fold only after acquiring the second drug.
A relevant market containing both drugs would have seemed obvious.
The district court, however, did not implement the antitrust dichotomy.
It considered the value of competition within particular realms of the drug
industry.407 At trial, the parties offered conflicting testimony as to whether
doctors considered price in choosing between the two drugs.408 The district
court, however, did not implement the antitrust dichotomy. It considered the
value of competition within particular realms of the drug industry.409 At
trial, the parties offered conflicting testimony as to whether doctors considered price in choosing between the two drugs.410 Latching onto that testimony, the court “found” doctors would not consider price and thus (1) the
two drugs were in separate markets and thus (2) the acquisition of the second drug did not create market power.411 Viewed through the standard
paradigm, the decision appears inexplicable. Even if doctors were the sole

404

Id. at *11, *13 (referring to market shares based on a PDA market).
Id. at *12–13.
406
Id. at *11.
407
Id. at *19–22.
408
Id. at *14–19 (for example Dr. Mark Mammel, a neonatologist in St. Paul Minnesota testified that he “would feel comfortable treating the vast majority of his patients
with either NeoProfen or Indocin IV,” but “[w]hen deciding between two possible treatments, [he] chooses the one that is safer, if he is persuaded that one is indeed safer. He
makes that decision without regard to cost”); id. at *21 (the court also cited evidence that
Bedford Laboratories—which had obtained FDA approval for a generic version of Indocin—did not forecast any impact of generic Indocin IV on NeoProfen).
409
Id. at *29–30.
410
Id. at *20–21.
411
Id. at *21.
405
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decision-makers—which they were not—those doctors would be influenced
by the quality of the two drugs, a basis of competition as legitimate as price.
One can understand—if not agree with—the court’s decision under
the best competitive makeup approach. In its answer to the FTC’s complaint, the defendant characterized the competitive makeup of the market
in the following way:
The group of patients for whom the drugs even theoretically may be acceptable clinical substitutes is small, such that a profit maximizing supplier of either drug would not alter prices across all sales in competitive
response to a price change by the other. Further, that already small theoretical population will decline as more doctors turn to the safer drug and
migrate to NeoProfen, and those doctors who want to use indomethacin,
for whatever clinical reason, have the option of a generic indomethacin.412

The court apparently agreed the drug industry did not require rivalry
on price.413 Doctors prescribe drugs, the court believed, in the best interests of the patient’s health.414 The short-run benefit of price rivalry was
thus small. Competition had much more value in regulating longer-run
competition to invent new and improved drug treatments, and rivalry in
the innovation realm would be stimulated by permitting drug makers to
extract significant profit from their sale of approved drugs, as the defendant had done.415
The district court thus appears to have determined the best competitive
makeup of the industry did not require rivalry on price or short-run quality.416 Whether the court correctly decided this case is a complicated question that should have been open to de novo review. By ostensibly resting
its decision on stage one of the dichotomy, however, the court effectively
isolated that decision from meaningful appellate review. This is the real
problem to which this Article now turns.

412

Answer of Defendant Ovation Pharm., Inc., FTC v. Lundbeck, Civil No. 08-6379
(JNE/JJG), 08-6381 (JNE/JJG), 2009 WL 407279 (D. Minn. Jan. 13, 2009) (No. 0806379 (JNE/JJG)).
413
See FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., Civil Nos. 08-6379 (JNE/JJG), 08-6381 (JNE/JJG),
2010 WL 3810015 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010).
414
Id. at *14.
415
Cf. Cont’l Orthopedic Appliances v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., Inc., 40 F.
Supp. 2d 109, 118–20 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (recognizing possibility that best competitive
makeup of insurance market could require competition for HMO patients separate from
all health insurance customers); Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dept. Stores Co., 881 F.
Supp. 860, 868–69 (W.D.N.Y. 1994) (recognizing that competitive makeup of retail
markets required competition among department stores separate from all retail).
416
See generally Lundbeck, 2010 WL 3810015.
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VI. DE NOVO REVIEW OF ALL ANTITRUST ISSUES
In developing definitions of a market, courts do not assess market power
directly by observing real world facts. They instead engage in a creative
process to determine the best competitive makeup of the relevant industry.417 After conducting this analysis, however, the trial judge translates its
results into the antitrust dichotomy’s terms, arbitrarily framing it as either:
(1) a stage one market power determination limiting appellate review or (2)
a stage two competitive effects assessment subject to plenary review. A trial
judge should be able to think creatively about how competition operates in
the industry before it, as the judge did in FTC v. Lundbeck.418 Given the importance of antitrust cases to the economy, however, a district court should
not have the power to dictate the level of appellate scrutiny that its decision
will receive as a result of its classification within the antitrust dichotomy.
If the Lundbeck court had held that the effect of the defendant’s acquisitions and pricing decisions did not harm consumers because longer-run
innovation competition is more beneficial than short-run price or quality
competition, that decision would have been reviewable de novo. Because
the judge held the two drugs were in different markets, however, the decision could be stricken down only if it were clearly erroneous.419 Since
there is no meaningful difference in the reasoning process that a trial court
would use to reach either of these decisions, an appellate court should
apply the same level of scrutiny in both cases. Additionally, because antitrust cases are both complex and important to wide segments of society,
that review should be plenary.
Using a de novo standard to review all antitrust questions would be
consistent with the federal courts’ existing practice of rigorously scrutinizing on appeal fact intensive issues with widespread social and economic
impact.420 This Part first illustrates the harm caused by deferential review

417

See supra notes 170–71 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Lundbeck, 2010 WL 3810015, at *21.
419
Similarly, if the trial court had ruled Alcoa lacked market power because recycled
aluminum was in the market and thus Alcoa’s share was too small, appellate review
would have been limited by the clearly erroneous standard. If instead, the trial court
decided that the effect of Alcoa’s conduct with respect to virgin ingot harmed consumers,
an appellate court would conduct de novo review. See generally Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945).
420
See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
513–14 (1984) (actual malice standard subject to de novo review even though it consists
of a fact finding about an individual’s state of mind); cf. Steven Semeraro, Responsibility
in Capital Sentencing, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 140–45 (2002) (arguing that Supreme
418
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of market structure questions under current antitrust law. It then reviews
numerous constitutional and statutory questions that the courts review de
novo despite the significant fact-finding that underlies the trial court’s
decision. Finally, this Part shows antitrust liability questions are similar to
those that the Court has chosen to scrutinize carefully.
A. Lundbeck as an Illustration of the Danger of Clearly Erroneous Review
The FTC appealed the Lundbeck case to the Eighth Circuit, arguing
that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard.421 By looking to
doctors, rather than hospitals or patients, and by ignoring marginal consumers and internal business strategy documents showing that the defendant itself viewed the two drugs as direct competitors, the Commission
contended, the trial court erred in holding at stage one of the dichotomy
that the two drugs were not in the same market.422
The Eighth Circuit panel acknowledged the persuasiveness of the
FTC’s argument, but found itself constrained by the clearly erroneous
standard.423 The defendant’s strategy to promote NeoProfen over Indocin
IV, the court reasoned, could “be interpreted to mean that while Indocin
IV was vulnerable to generics, NeoProfen was not, and thus the products
are not interchangeable.”424 Where two interpretations of the evidence are
plausible, the court held, “the factfinder’s choice between them is not
clearly erroneous.”425
The evidence showed some level of substitutability between the drugs,
and thus the conclusion that they were in different markets was a discretionary one turning on the trial judge’s view of the best competitive makeup of
the drug industry. The panel signaled that it might have decided the case
differently were it open to plenary review.426 Judge Kopf, a district judge
sitting by designation, wrote a concurrence describing the lower court’s
heavy reliance on the doctors’ testimony as “perplexing.”427 Doctors, Judge
Kopf recognized, had no incentive to rely on the economic factors that drive
antitrust analysis.428 “That oddity seems especially strange,” he explained,
Court’s practice of subjecting many findings of constitutional fact to probing review
justified similar review of the ultimate question in death penalty cases).
421
FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236, 1239 (8th Cir. 2011).
422
Id.
423
Id. at 1242–43.
424
Id. at 1242.
425
Id.
426
Id. at 1243 (“Whether this court would come to the same conclusion is irrelevant.”).
427
Id. (Kopf, J., concurring).
428
Id.
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“where, as here, there is no real dispute that (1) both drugs are effective
when used to treat the illness about which the doctors testified and (2) internal records from the defendant raise an odor of predation.”429 He concurred
in the panel opinion, however, because “the standard of review carries the
day in this case as it does in so many others.”430
B. Policy Drives the Standard of Review
Outside the antitrust context, the federal courts decide whether to treat a
finding as one of fact, subject to deferential review, or one of law, subject to
plenary review, by examining the role of appellate review in the substantive
area of law, rather than the inherent nature of the question.431 Many issues
bearing all of the earmarks of findings of fact are reviewed by appellate
courts de novo. At common law, for example, the issue of whether probable
cause existed to prosecute a case was a question of law, even though it
clearly required the court to make findings about the information available
to the entity filing the case.432 Under modern law, the Supreme Court has
adopted a de novo standard for factual questions in cases dealing with key
clauses of the First,433 Fourth,434 Fifth,435 Sixth,436 Eighth,437 and Fourteenth

429

Id.
Id. (emphasis added). Appellate courts have upheld trial court decisions as not clearly
erroneous despite apparent doubt about the result. See, e.g., California v. Am. Stores Co.,
872 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Were we to evaluate independently the evidence of the
relevant product market, we might reach a different conclusion.”); SmithKline Corp. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1065 (3d Cir. 1978) (rejecting defendant’s attempt to show that
district court finding of sub-market in certain types of antibiotics was clearly erroneous).
431
Some commentators have argued the distinction between questions of law and fact
is incoherent. See JOHN DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 55 (1927); LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 270 (1930);
LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546–48 (1965).
432
George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 N W. U. L. R EV.
14, 17 (1992).
433
See infra Parts VI.B.1.a–VI.B.1.b.
434
See infra Part VI.B.1.c.
435
Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 107–09 (1995) (holding the in custody requirement of the Miranda rule is subject to de novo review).
436
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698 (1984) (holding reasonableness of
counsel subject to de novo review); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341–42 (1980)
(holding potential conflict of interest from multiple representation subject to de novo
review); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 397 n.4, 403–04 (1977) (holding waiver of
Sixth Amendment right to counsel subject to de novo review).
437
See infra Part VI.B.1.c.
430
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Amendments.438 And some federal appellate courts have similarly reviewed
factual questions de novo under important statutory schemes.439
This subsection describes the issues appellate courts review de novo
and compares them to the market definition and market power questions in
antitrust cases. It concludes that nothing compels the courts to use a deferential standard to review market definition findings under stage one of the
antitrust dichotomy. On the contrary, many of the issues appellate courts
now review de novo require judges to implement intensely factual, vaguely worded standards designed to safeguard important social values. The
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Unreasonable Search
Clause of the Fourth are two examples. The high stakes in antitrust cases,
in terms of both the availability of treble damages and attorney’s fees,440
the impact on the broader economy, and the need for creativity in determining the best competitive makeup of an industry, make the case for de
novo review of all antitrust issues, if anything, stronger.
1. Constitutional Issues
The following sub-sections review areas of constitutional law in which
the Supreme Court requires de novo review of fact findings.
a. Obscenity
In the late 1950s, the Court held speech that (1) appeals to a prurient interest, (2) is patently offensive, and (3) lacks social value, is obscene and
may thus be suppressed.441 The Court noted the importance of the role of
438

See infra Part VI.B.1.e (due process implications of punitive damages); Sumner v.
Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597 (1982) (per curiam) (holding sufficiency of pre-trial identification procedures subject to de novo review).
Constitutional issues on which appellate courts are not required to conduct an independent review of key fact findings are those in which the trial judge has unique access to evidence necessary to make critical credibility determinations. See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467
U.S. 1025, 1036 (1984) (juror impartiality); Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111, 117 (1983)
(per curiam) (competency to stand trial). Trial judges in antitrust cases do not have unique
access to the information needed to assess the competitive makeup of an industry. They
obviously rely on evidence provided by the parties and the testimony of experts.
439
See infra Part VI.B.2.
440
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15(a) (West 2014).
441
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481-87 (1957). The Court later refined the
test in Miller v. California, declaring that:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
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the jury in these proceedings,442 thus deemphasizing the role of appellate
courts. If the trial court followed the correct procedure, the finder of fact would
have the last word, subject to deferential sufficiency of the evidence review.443
Justice Harlan wrote a separate opinion, criticizing this approach. The
constitutional issue, he wrote was “not really an issue of fact but a question of constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind.”444
Every case involving the suppression of speech “has an individuality and
‘value’ of its own.”445 But that uniqueness, Harlan reasoned, weighed in
favor of heightened review, not deference: “a reviewing court must determine for itself whether the attacked expression is suppressible within constitutional standards. Since those standards do not readily lend themselves
to generalized definitions, the constitutional problem in the last analysis
becomes one of particularized judgments which appellate courts must
make for themselves.”446
Within a few years, the Court came to agree with Justice Harlan that
appellate courts could not rely “on a ‘sufficient evidence’ standard of
review,” but must instead review the decision de novo.447 Even after reformulating the test to reference local community standards,448 the Court
reiterated that appellate courts were required to conduct probing review.449
Requiring a trier of fact to decide an obscenity case in accordance with its
own understanding of the tolerance of the average person in their community, the Court explained, “does not mean ... that obscenity convictions

whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (internal citations omitted).
442
Roth, 354 U.S. at 489–91; see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 33–34 (“As the Court made
clear in Mishkin v. New York, the primary concern with requiring a jury to apply the
standard of ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards' is to be
certain that, so far as material is not aimed at a deviant group, it will be judged by its
impact on an average person, rather than a particularly susceptible or sensitive person—
or indeed a totally insensitive one.” (citations omitted)).
443
Roth, 354 U.S. at 476.
444
Id. at 498 (Harlan, J., concurring in result and dissenting).
445
Id. at 497.
446
Id.
447
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 190 n.6 (1964) (per Brennan, J.) (“[T]his
Court cannot avoid making an independent constitutional judgment on the facts of the
case as to whether the material involved is constitutionally protected.”).
448
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 302–03 (1977).
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will be virtually unreviewable.”450 On the contrary, the Court held that
“[t]he type of conduct depicted must fall within the substantive limitations
suggested” by the Court, and appellate courts had a responsibility to ensure the preservation of constitutional values.451
b. Libel
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court again adopted an imprecise standard that asked the judge or jury to find facts based on an understanding of human nature.452 The Free Speech Clause was held to require
that a public figure in a libel case prove the defendant acted with actual
malice, i.e., purposely published a false statement or exhibited a reckless
disregard for the truth.453 As in the obscenity cases, the Court imposed a
duty on appellate courts to independently examine the record.454
The Court’s reasoning mirrored that in the obscenity cases. It held this
“rule of independent review assigns to judges a constitutional responsibility
that cannot be delegated to the trier of fact.”455 This rule, the Court explained, “reflects a deeply held conviction that judges ... must exercise such
review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained
by the Constitution.”456 Also, this is particularly true where the substantive
standard is “not readily captured in ‘one infallible definition.’”457
c. Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion
Before police officers may stop and frisk an individual, the Fourth
Amendment requires that they must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion
450

Id. (“[Applying] community standards does not mean, however, that juror discretion in this area is to go unchecked.”).
451
Id. For example, in Jenkins v. Georgia, the Court unanimously rejected the argument that, under Miller, once the jury resolved the obscenity question, the job of the
appellate court was merely to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support
it. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 159–60 (1974). Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, explained that appellate courts retained “the ultimate power ... to conduct an
independent review of constitutional claims when necessary” to preserve First Amendment values. Id. at 160. See also Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 503 (1987); Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 124 (1974).
452
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
453
Id. at 279–80.
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Id. at 284–85 (citing Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963)).
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Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 501 (1984). See
Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) (“Judges, as expositors
of the Constitution, have a duty to independently decide whether the evidence in the record is
sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 510–11.
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that crime is afoot.458 In order to conduct a full-scale search, the officer
must have probable cause to believe evidence of criminal activity will be
found in the place to be searched.459 In considering the appropriate standard of review, the Court explained that “[a]rticulating precisely what ‘reasonable suspicion’ and ‘probable cause’ mean is not possible. They are
commonsense, nontechnical conceptions that deal with ‘the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act.’”460
The Court distinguished these sorts of legal standards from more precise concepts such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt where greater
deference is appropriate.461 “[F]luid concepts” like probable cause, the
Court explained, “take their substantive content from the particular contexts in which the standards are being assessed,”462 and as a result, one
case will seldom serve as precedent for another.463 An appellate court must
therefore review the trial judge’s decision de novo in order to protect
Fourth Amendment values.464
d. Excessive Fines
The Constitution prohibits a government-imposed fine that is “grossly
disproportional to the gravity of [a defendant’s] offense.”465 This standard
is similar in its lack of precision and its reference to communal values to
the standards applied in other constitutional cases.466 Not surprisingly, the
Court required de novo appellate review.467
e. Punitive Damages
Historically, civil juries had unfettered discretion to impose punitive
damages. In the early 1990s, however, the Court held that the Due Process
Clause limited their use.468 Punitive damages, the Court held, could not be
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grossly excessive with respect to the defendant’s conduct,469 and it required de novo review of that fact-intensive question.470
2. Statutory Issues
Lower courts have also applied de novo review to discretionary factintensive questions under important statutory schemes that, like the antitrust
laws, have significant economic impact.471 For example, the economic
substance doctrine holds a transaction formally satisfying a provision of
the tax code may nonetheless be deemed improper if it has no economic
substance separate from tax avoidance.472 Also, in trademark infringement
cases, liability turns on whether an unauthorized use of the mark in commerce creates a likelihood of confusion.473 Although both of these issues
are fact intensive, at least three circuits—and perhaps as many as seven—
review economic substance questions de novo474 and several circuits similarly apply plenary review to the likelihood of confusion issue.475
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BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 562 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453–55 (1993) (plurality opinion).
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See, e.g., Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
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we review without deference”); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 435 F.3d 594, 599 (6th
Cir. 2006) (same); James v. Comm’r, 899 F.2d 905, 909 (10th Cir. 1990) (same). Four
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Comm’r, 293 F.3d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 2002) (reviewing under “clear error” standard), Harbor Bancorp & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 115 F.3d 722, 727 (9th Cir. 1997) (same), Karr v.
Comm’r, 924 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1991) (same), and Massengill v. Comm’r, 876
F.2d 616, 619 (8th Cir. 1989) (same), with Compaq Computer Corp. & Subsidiaries v.
Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 780–81 (5th Cir. 2001) (reviewed de novo), IES Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 253 F.3d 350, 351 (8th Cir. 2001) (same), United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc. v.
Comm’r, 254 F.3d 1014, 1017 (11th Cir. 2001), and Sacks v. Comm’r, 69 F.3d 982, 986
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Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2006); Nicole Rose Corp. v. Comm’r,
320 F.3d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 2002); ASA Investerings P’ship v. Comm’r, 201 F.3d 505, 511
(D.C. Cir. 2000); ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 245 (3d Cir. 1998); N. Ind. Pub.
Serv. Co. v. Comm’r, 115 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1997).
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C. Comparing Antitrust Issues to Those That Courts Review De Novo
The line of cases described above contains two common elements.
First, each involves an issue of significant public importance. Some deal
with fundamental rights, such as free speech,476 others involve important
economic issues, including punitive damages,477 excessive fines,478 and
the likelihood of confusion in trademark cases.479
Second, in these cases, the appellate courts have been unable to devise
clear rules that would definitively resolve most disputes. Instead, the court
must apply situation-specific standards that are imbued with meaning by
the way courts apply them, rather than by the terms used to describe them.
“[T]he content of the rule,” the Court has explained, “is not revealed simply by its literal text, but rather is given meaning through the evolutionary
process of common-law adjudication.”480 The concepts in these cases are
“fluid” and “cannot be articulated with precision,”481 and independent
appellate review ensures the appellate courts “maintain control of, and [are
able] to clarify, the legal principles.”482 At its root, probing appellate review of important fact intensive issues “‘assure[s] the uniform general
treatment of similarly situated persons that is the essence of law itself.’”483
These rationales for heightened review apply with full force to antitrust
cases. To be sure, competition is not a fundamental right.484 The Supreme
Court, however, has recognized the antitrust laws’ pseudo-constitutional
status, describing them as “the Magna Carta of free enterprise[,] as important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise
476
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potentially may guide police, unify precedent, and stabilize the law.”).
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system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal
freedoms.”485 Antitrust plaintiffs can obtain treble damages and attorney’s
fees,486 directly mirroring the justification for applying de novo review in
excessive fines and punitive damages cases. Additionally, the broad impact of antitrust decisions on the economy makes these cases of widespread public importance.
Antitrust issues are also extremely fluid in the way that has led the Supreme Court in other areas to require de novo review. The trier-of-fact
must determine whether relevant facts fit within the scope of an imprecise
judge-made substantive rule that draws on values and interpretations that
extend beyond credibility and right or wrong decisions. The metes and
bounds of efficient competition will vary from industry to industry and
thus case to case. The “literal text” of judge-made antitrust rules, much
less the statutory language, reveals virtually none of the law’s content. All
of its meaning comes through the evolutionary process of common-law
adjudication. As the Supreme Court explained in an early antitrust case:
[T]he application of the rules of decision in ... each case arising under
the [antitrust laws] must be determined upon the particular facts disclosed by the record, and that the opinions in those cases must be read
in the light ... of a clear recognition of the essential differences in the
facts of those cases, and in the facts of any new case to which the rule
of earlier decisions is to be applied.487

Antitrust issues and those to which the courts now apply de novo review
are thus indistinguishable.
CONCLUSION
Nothing approaching antitrust’s dichotomous analytic paradigm is
true. Market definition is creative, not observational, and the ostensibly
separate inquiries into market power and competitive effects are really a
single endeavor designed to determine conceptually the industry’s best
competitive makeup. Although that term of art is foreign to the antitrust
vocabulary, it captures actual antitrust practice in the courts. Everybody
knows pure competition is a fiction; all industries involve an amalgam of
competitive and cooperative realms. Antitrust requires competition in
485
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those realms where it serves consumer interests, and the case law supports
the conclusion that courts use the best competitive makeup approach to
determine when the law requires rivalry.
Antitrust thus has an artificial heart. The paradigm supposedly guiding
it is false. As Kaplow illustrates, the rhetoric of market definition is a
sham in the sense that courts do not observe consumer behavior and discover markets. But so is the rhetoric of market power.488 Knowing that a
defendant has the ability to raise price profitably is just a small piece of
the potentially relevant information necessary to resolve an antitrust case.
Where Kaplow’s project was unabashedly “destructive,”489 the goal
here is revelatory. That is, to show that courts decide antitrust cases
through a process of determining the best competitive makeup of an industry. Grappling with the interactions between competitive realms, cooperative realms, and those isolated from competition is a challenging task. One
might question whether courts are capable of handling it. It would certainly be conceivable to imagine an antitrust regime governed by bright-line,
prophylactic rules. That regime, however, would differ from the one we
have,490 and Austrian economics provides a theoretical justification for
concluding that thoughtful judges can do a better job of resolving antitrust
issues than would mindless, automaton courts applying necessarily overand under-inclusive bright-line, prophylactic rules.
More important, the Supreme Court has to date, including its most recent 2013 decision, demanded that federal district judges engage theory
and make thoughtful antitrust decisions.491 To be sure, courts ostensibly
continue to recite the rhetoric of the antitrust dichotomy. That process,
however, may enable them to determine an industry’s best competitive
makeup more effectively than a “just look at everything” approach would.
Although much of this Article is interpretive, attempting to explain
what courts actually do when they say they are defining markets, the final
Part offers a specific prescriptive proposal. Appellate courts should abandon the clearly erroneous standard of review with regard to market definition. The Supreme Court requires independent appellate scrutiny of factfindings controlling important issues of public policy that are indistinguishable from the antitrust laws. It would thus be a small, but important,
step to require de novo review of all antitrust issues.
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